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I. INTRODUCTION

Millions of Americans rest assured that the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act' ("ACA") provides tax credits for health
insurance to individuals earning 100-400% of the federal poverty
line. 2 The tax credits will be accessible through state insurance
exchanges, also known as Marketplaces, 3 which are governmentregulated organizations designed to create more competition in the
health insurance industry. 4 But a gap in the unwieldy, two-thousandplus-page statute-either a scrivener's error or an overlooked
loophole-is raising questions about whether citizens in certain states
are eligible for the tax credits. This "quirk" could be a serious blow to
an already contentious healthcare-reform effort.5
The ACA, deemed constitutional by a divided Supreme Court in
June 2012,6 requires all residents of the United States to retain
minimum essential health coverage and imposes a tax penalty for
failure to do so. 7 The individual mandate, as this requirement is
known, is softened by tax credits, or subsidies, made available to
1.
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010) (to be codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. & 26 U.S.C.), and the Health Care and
Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 (HCERA), Pub. L. No. Law 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029, are
collectively referred to as the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.
2.
In 2011, 100% was $22,350 and 400% was $89,400 for a family of four. Annual Update
of the HHS Poverty Guidelines, 76 Fed. Reg. 3637-38 (Jan. 20, 2011). See generally U.S. DEP'T
OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE 2011 HHS POVERTY GUIDELINES (2011), available at
http://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty/llpoverty.shtml. Most of the nation's uninsured are low- or
moderate-income; nine in ten fall below 400% of the federal poverty line. THE KAISER COMM'N ON
MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED,

FIVE FACTS ABOUT THE UNINSURED

1 (2011), available at

http://www.kff.org/uninsured/upload/7806-04.pdf.
3.
This Note uses the term "exchanges," as that is the language set out in the statute. As
part of a rebranding effort, the Obama Administration started using "Marketplaces" in January
2013. Sam Baker, Obama Officials Ditch 'Exchanges' in Rebranding of Healthcare Reform Law,
THE
HILL
(Jan.
20,
2013),
http://thehill.com/blogs/healthwatchlhealth-reformimplementation/278105-obama-officials-ditch-exchanges-in-rebranding-of-healthcare-law.
4.
See infra Part II; see also David M. Herszenhorn, Explaining the 'Exchange'-A Primer,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 15, 2009), http://prescriptions.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/09/15/explaining-theexchange-a-primer/.
5.
David Hogberg, Oops! No ObamaCareTax Credit Via Federal Exchanges?, INVESTOR'S
Bus. DAILY (Sept. 7, 2011, 6:40 PM), http://news.investors.com/Article/584085/201109071840/
ObamaCare-Subsidy-Error-Found.htm.
6.
Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2572-75 (2012).
7.
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1501(b), 124
Stat. 119 (2010) (to be codified at I.R.C. § 5000A); Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2594, 2600.
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eligible individuals purchasing insurance through one-stop-shop
exchanges. 8 Either the state or federal government will establish an
American Health Benefit Exchange in each state; however, the ACA,
read literally, does not make tax credits available through federally
established exchanges. 9 Was the omission of tax credits through
federal exchanges intentional? Or is this a would-be amendment that
slipped through the cracks of the massive bill-a manifestation of
House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's infamous comment that "we have to
pass this bill to find out what is in it"?10

The Internal Revenue Service ("IRS"), the agency charged with
administering the tax credits, is looking beyond the seemingly plain
text of the statute: in a final rule, the agency interpreted the statute
as making tax credits available through both state and federal
exchanges." There are two important questions to ask regarding this
interpretation: (1) Does the IRS have the authority to interpret the
text in this way? (2) Who would have standing to challenge such a
reading?
This Note explores these two questions and explains, from an
advocacy standpoint, why traditional tools of statutory interpretation
suggest that the IRS acted within its prescribed bounds in construing
the statute broadly. Significantly, subsequent legislation shows that
the agency is implementing the statutory scheme Congress
envisioned. Part II outlines the state of health insurance prior to the
changes instituted by the ACA, explains the role of the exchanges in
healthcare reform, and details why Congress amended the statute to
include the option of federal exchanges. Part III argues that large
employers might have standing to challenge the IRS's rule because
they would be injured by the statutory provision that grants tax
credits to those who use federal exchanges. Part IV analyzes the gap
in the statute by considering the plain text, the other provisions of the
Act, the legislative history, and the postenactment legislation. Finally,
Part V suggests the appropriate framework for judicial review of the
current IRS rule; it walks through the two-step test found in Chevron
8.
9.

ACA § 1401(a) (to be codified at I.R.C.
Id.; § 1321(c); Hogberg, supra note 5.

§ 36B(b)(2)).

10.

David Freddoso, Pelosi on Health Care: 'We Have to Pass the Bill So You Can Find Out

What Is in It...,' WASH. EXAMINER (Mar. 9, 2010), http://washingtonexaminer.comfblogs/beltwayconfidential/pelosi-health-care-039we-have-pass-bill-so-you-can-find-out-what-it39.
11. Treas. Reg. §§ 1, 602 (2012) (stating via final regulation that statutory language,
purpose, and structure support the IRS interpretation); Health Insurance Premium Tax Credit,
77 Fed. Reg. 30,377, 30,378 (May 17, 2012) (final regulations); Treas. Reg. § 1.36; 45 C.F.R. §
155.20 (2011); 76 Fed. Reg. 50,934, 50,940 (Aug. 17, 2011) (adopting in a proposed rule the same
definition for "exchange" as in 45 C.F.R. 155.20, which includes exchanges established by the
federal government under § 1321(c) of the ACA); see also Hogberg, supra note 5.
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v. Natural Resources Defense Council, the controlling case requiring
deference to an agency's statutory interpretation,12 by asking whether
the statute is ambiguous and whether the IRS interpretation is
reasonable. Answering both these questions in the affirmative, this
Note concludes that a court will likely defer to the IRS interpretation
of the statute.
II. BACKGROUND ON THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT AND EXCHANGES
The ACA, amended by the Health Care and Education
Reconciliation Act of 2010 ("HCERA"), seeks to improve the
navigability of the health insurance marketplace. 13 Pursuant to this
legislation, an exchange in each state will facilitate the purchase of
qualified health plans, acting as a central portal for consumers to find
and compare health insurance options.14 Given projections that
premiums in the health insurance market will rise as a result of the
ACA, the tax credit, which reduces out-of-pocket premium costs for
certain individuals, is integral to acceptance of and compliance with
the individual mandate.15 Those who do not, or cannot, comply with
the individual mandate will face a tax penalty.16 However, section
1401 of the ACA, which adds section 36B to the Internal Revenue
Code ("IRC"), establishes that tax credits for the purchase of health

12. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
13. E.g., ACA §§ 1103, 1201, 1311(b) (to be codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.);
Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 (HCERA), Pub. L. No. Law 111-152, §
2301, 124 Stat. 1029. For a brief history of the politics of enacting the ACA, see Jonathan H.

Adler & Michael F. Cannon, Taxation Without Representation:The Illegal IRS Rule to Expand
Tax Credits Under the PPACA 5-7 (Case Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2012-27, 2012),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2106789.
14. ACA § 1311(d)(2) ("An Exchange shall make available qualified health plans to
qualified individuals and qualified employers."); 42 U.S.C. § 18021 (2010). See generally Health

Insurance Exchange Establishment Grants Fact Sheet, HEALTHCARE.GOV (Jan. 20, 2011),
http://www.healthcare.gov/news/factsheets/2011/01/exchestannc.html.
15. Letter from Douglas W. Elmendorf, Dir., Cong. Budget Office, to the Honorable Evan
Bayh, U. S. Senate (Nov. 30, 2009) [hereinafter Elmendorf Letter] (including as an attachment
AN ANALYSIS OF HEALTH INSURANCE PREMIUMS UNDER THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT (2009)), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/107xx/docl0781/11-30-

Premiums.pdf; see also Peter Suderman, CBO: Senate's Health Care Reform Bill Would Cause
Individual-Market Insurance Premiums to Rise, REASON MAC. (Nov. 30, 2009),
http://reason.com/blog/2009/11/30/cbo-senates-health-care-reform (discussing the likely increase
and the CBO Report).
16. ACA § 1501(b) (to be codified at I.R.C. § 5000A). The penalty is capped at the lesser of
(1) the national average premium for qualified health plans offered through exchanges or (2) the
sum of monthly penalty amounts (the greater of a flat dollar amount of about $2,100 or 2.5% of
income). ACA § 10106(b); HCERA § 1002(a).
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insurance will be available only to those who purchase through an
exchange. 17
Although an early draft of the ACA was worded in such a way
to compel each state to establish an exchange, the statute as enacted
gives states the flexibility to elect not to establish an exchange: section
1321(c) provides that the Secretary of Health and Human Services
shall run a federal exchange in a state that opts out.' 8 However, the
current tax credit provision (section 1401) does not reflect this
change. 19 That is, tax credits for state residents are only available if
the state elects to create an exchange; state residents do not get the
tax benefit if the exchange in their state was established by the
federal government. As a result of this discrepancy, lower-income
individuals in states electing not to establish an exchange will be
required, under the individual mandate, to buy insurance without the
tax credits meant to help make coverage more affordable.
This Part first discusses the reasons behind the push for
healthcare reform and then considers how useful the exchanges might
be in achieving the goal of affordable insurance. Next, it explains why
Congress chose the scheme that gives states the option to establish an
exchange or allow the federal government to take the reins and
discusses how the textual conundrum in section 1401 came to be.
Lastly, this Part lays out the IRS's approach to interpreting the tax
credit provision.
A. Exchanges and Affordability
"The Exchanges play important roles as advocates of
insurance affordability, as administrators of cost-sharing
reduction subsidies, and as gateways to other public
programs."
- Timothy Stoltzfus Jost

20

At the core of the ACA is the requirement that every American
citizen have health insurance beginning in 2014. This shift to a
"culture of coverage" is a dramatic departure from the pre-ACA state
of affairs: 49.9 million Americans (over 16% of the population) were

17.
18.

19.

ACA § 1401(a) (to be codified at I.R.C.
Id. § 1321(c).
See infra Part II.C.

§ 36B(b)(2)).

20. TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS JOST, HEALTH INSURANCE EXCHANGES AND THE AFFORDABLE CARE
ACT: KEY POLICY ISSUES 30 (2010).
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uninsured in 2010,21 and millions more were underinsured. 22 Lack of
insurance not only affects financial well-being, 23 it also increases the
likelihood of poor health outcomes. 24 For example, it is estimated that
continuous health coverage could decrease premature mortality rates
of uninsured adults by up to 25%. Further, healthcare can be seen as
"at least a partial public good"-infection, for example, can have a
broad population effect. 25 The uninsured may delay treatment or not
receive it at all, increasing the chance that infection will spread. 26 In
this way, lack of health insurance "threatens the health of not only the
uninsured ... but everyone else as well." 27
Ill-fated proposals for a national health insurance scheme have
appeared on the federal agenda for over a half century, alongside
proposals for federal programs to control healthcare costs. 28 President
Carter was one of a handful who took on the challenge, setting forth a
hospital rate-setting program that was rejected by Congress. 29
President Clinton proposed a national "managed competition"
program that allowed for both regulatory and free-market elements in
a national insurance framework-this was also rejected by Congress. 30
The recent momentum for change could be attributed in part to
the decline in private health insurance as a benefit of employment,
which resulted in the increasing cost consciousness of healthcare

21.
CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH
INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2010, at 23 (2011).
22. WENDY E. PARMET, POPULATIONS, PUBLIC HEALTH, AND THE LAw 196 (2009).
23. The uninsured pay an average thirty-five percent of costs out-of-pocket and are often
charged higher amounts than the insured pay for care. Twenty-seven percent of the uninsured
report having used up all or most of their savings on medical bills. THE KAISER COMM'N ON
MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, supra note 2, at 6.
24. THE KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, THE UNINSURED AND THE
DIFFERENCE HEALTH INSURANCE MAKES 2 (2008), available at http://www.kff.org/uninsured/
upload/1420-10.pdf. Uninsured adults are less likely to receive preventative care and are four
times more likely to delay or forgo needed care than the insured, which increases the likelihood
of hospitalization for avoidable conditions. Id. Insurance leads to better clinical outcomes for
ailments including diabetes, cardiovascular disease, and HIV infection. See COMM. ON THE
CONSEQUENCES OF UNINSURANCE, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, CARE WITHOUT COVERAGE: Too
LITTLE, TOO LATE 57 (2002) (discussing how uninsured patients with these chronic illnesses
experienced worse clinical outcomes).
25. PARMET, supra note 22, at 208-09.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. See KENNETH R. WING, THE LAW AND THE PUBLIC's HEALTH 143 (6th ed. 2003); see also,
e.g., Hospital Cost Containment Act of 1979, H.R. 2626, 96th Cong.; Health Security Act, H.R.
3600, 103rd Cong. (1993).
29. WING, supra note 28, at 143.
30. Id.
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consumers.31 The weak economy further compounded the rate of
underinsurance and the increasing percentage of those lacking private
insurance.32 At the same time, a worrisome escalation in national
healthcare spending caused the Congressional Budget Office ("CBO")
to project that healthcare spending will reach 30% of gross domestic
product in a quarter century and half of gross domestic product within
seventy-five years.33
To reverse the trend toward underinsurance or lack of
insurance, the ACA requires individuals to carry "minimum essential
coverage." Making coverage mandatory discourages healthy
individuals from staying out of the market completely, pushing back
against adverse-selection problems. Adverse selection is the tendency
for less healthy (higher-cost) patients to obtain insurance coverage
while healthier (lower-cost) patients buy elsewhere or do not enter the
market at all. Ultimately, for an insurance scheme to succeed, it must
capture a sufficiently large share of healthy participants so that it can
offset the costs of covering the higher-cost individuals.
The minimum-essential-coverage requirement is satisfied by
obtaining insurance through a government program such as Medicaid
or the Children's Health Insurance Program, or by purchasing (1)
employer-sponsored insurance, 34 (2) insurance through an exchange,
or (3) insurance directly from an insurer in the individual market. 35
The CBO and the Joint Committee on Taxation expect that the ACA
will increase the number of nonelderly Americans with health
insurance by about thirty-two million in 2016 and about thirty-four
million in 2021.36
31. See generally THE KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, supra note 24
(discussing the decline in employer-provided health insurance).
32. THE KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, supra note 2, at 7.
33.
CONG. BUDGET OFF., THE LONG-TERM OUTLOOK FOR HEALTH CARE SPENDING (2007),
available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/87xx/doc8758/11-13-LT-Health.pdff cf. Elmendorf Letter,
supranote 15, at 6 (discussing a similar rise in health insurance premiums).
34. Nearly 160 million people under age sixty-five obtain health coverage through the
workplace. Jennifer Haberkorn, Health Policy Brief Employers and Health Care Reform,
HEALTH
AFF.,
1-2
(Mar.
9,
2011),
http://www.healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/
brief.php?briefid=42.
35. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1501(b),
124 Stat. 119 (2010) (to be codified at I.R.C. § 5000A).
36.
CBO's March 2011 Estimate of the Effects of the Insurance Coverage Provisions
Contained in the PatientProtection and Affordable CareAct (PublicLaw 111-148) and the Health
Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-152), CONG. BUDGET OFF. (Mar. 18,
2011), http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/HealthInsuranceProvisions.pdf.
About 95% of legal nonelderly residents will have insurance coverage in 2021, compared with a
projected 82% in the absence of the ACA. The 2010 level was 83%. Douglas W. Elmendorf,
Testimony on Last Year's Major Health Care Legislation, CONG. BUDGET OFF. (Mar. 30, 2011),
http://www.cbo.gov/publication/25155.
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The expected increase in insureds might be attributable in part
to an expected increase in employer-sponsored plans, which were
responsible for the health coverage of nearly 160 million people under
age sixty-five in 2010.37 Although the ACA does not require employers
to offer health insurance coverage to employees, it incentivizes doing
so. Section 4980H imposes a nondeductible penalty on large employers
(defined as an employer with fifty or more full-time employees) if any
of their full-time employees qualify for and receive federal tax credits
through an exchange. 38 In this "play or pay" system, the employer will
face additional fines if the coverage offered to its employees is not
comprehensive and affordable. 39 To be comprehensive, at least 60% of
healthcare expenses must be covered; 40 to be affordable, coverage
must cost less than 9.5% of the employee's household income.41
Featured in the Act's very title, this affordability theme runs
throughout the ACA.
B. The Utility of Exchanges
Affordability of minimum essential coverage
public acceptance and success of the ACA reforms.
through competition is the basic premise of the
exchanges; these organized markets have been
"[t]ravelocity for health insurance

[where]

...

is crucial for
Lower prices
one-stop-shop
described as

[t]he comparison

shopping and bidding dynamics [exert] downward pressure on

37. Haberkorn, supra note 34, at 1-2 (citing KAISER FAMILY FOUND. & HEALTH RESEARCH
& EDuc. TRUST, EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS: 2010 ANNUAL SURVEY (2010), available at
http://www.changehealthcare.com/downloads/industry/Kaiser-2010-Benefit-Survey.pdf).
38. ACA § 1513 (to be codified at I.R.C. § 4980H); I.R.S. Notice 2012-58, 2012-41 I.R.B. 436;
see also HINDA CHAIKIND & CHRIS L. PETERSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41159, SUMMARY OF
POTENTIAL EMPLOYER PENALTIES UNDER THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT
at
http://www.shrm.org/hrdisciplinesbenefits/Documents/
(2010),
available
(ACA)
EmployerPenalties.pdf. It is difficult for employers to reduce the risk of penalty, because they do
not know the household income of employees. CBO's Analysis of the Major Health Care
Legislation Enacted in March 2010: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Health, Comm. on Energy
and Commerce, 112th Cong. 8 (2011) [hereinafter CBO's Analysis of the Major Health Care
Legislation Enacted in March 2010] (statement of Douglas W. Elmendorf, Director,
Congressional Budget Office), available at http://www.ebo.gov/ftpdocs/121xx/docl2119/03-30healthcarelegislation.pdf.
39. A large employer who fails to meet these two requirements must pay a $3000 annual
assessment for each employee who declines employer-sponsored insurance and instead obtains
government-subsidized coverage through an exchange. ACA §§ 513, 1302(d), 1401, 2707; see also
Haberkorn, supra note 34, at 2 (discussing the fee provision).
40. ACA §§ 1302(d), 2707.
41. Id. §§ 1513, 1401 (to be codified at I.R.C. § 36B(c)).
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premiums."42 Transparency provisions of the ACA will aid consumers
as they peruse the figurative aisles of the exchanges, comparing
health plans based on factors such as quality, access, and premiums. 43
Early visions of the insurance marketplaces had the states
designing their own exchanges, but the addition of section 1321
increased centralization. As a result, the structure of the exchanges
will likely be similar across states.
According to the Department of Health and Human Services
("HHS"), the exchanges will set up a "level playing field" on which
insurance companies can compete; they will offer consumers "a choice
of health plans to fit their needs," and they will "give individuals and
small businesses the same purchasing clout as big business."44 The
CBO projected that exchanges will reduce premiums for existing
plans. 45
Enrollment in health insurance plans is expected to increase as
a result of the exchanges. The CBO estimated that, in 2021,
approximately twenty-four million people will have purchased their
own coverage through insurance exchanges, 46 and 81% of those
individuals will have received tax credits, 47 with the average credit per
subsidized enrollee being $7,080.48 In its report on expected enrollees,
the Kaiser Family Foundation estimated that, in 2019, exchanges will
42. Julie Rovner, House, Senate View Health Exchanges Differently, NPR (Jan. 12, 2010),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=122476051
(quoting Jon Kingsdale,
executive director of the Commonwealth Health Insurance Connector Authority, a health
insurance exchange in Massachusetts). See generally STATE HEALTH ACCESS DATA ASSISTANCE
CTR., ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., HEALTH INSURANCE EXCHANGES: IMPLEMENTATION AND
DATA CONSIDERATIONS FOR STATES AND EXISTING MODELS FOR COMPARISON 8-10 (2010)
(comparing Exchange models in Massachusetts, Utah, Connecticut, and Washington); Reed
Abelson, Health Insurance Exchanges: Will They Work?, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/06/business/06exchange.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0
(describing current lack of competition in health insurance market); Establishing Health
Insurance Exchanges: An Update on State Efforts, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Nov. 2012),
http://kff.org/healthreform/upload/8213.pdf (outlining structural options for Exchanges).

43.

See Jon Kingsdale, Health Insurance Exchanges - Key Link in a Better-Value Chain,

NEW ENG. J. MED. 2147, 2149 (2010) (describing transparency as the exchange's third major
function).
44. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Establishment of Exchanges and Qualified
Health Plans, 76 Fed. Reg. 41,866 (proposed July 2011) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 155-56).
45. Elmendorf Letter, supra note 15.

46.

CBO's Analysis of the Major Health Care Legislation Enacted in March 2010, supra

note 38 (citing CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 36); see also Letter from Douglas W.
Elmendorf, Director, Congressional Budget Office, to the Honorable Nancy Pelosi, Speaker, U.S.
House of Representatives (Mar. 20, 2010).
47. Elmendorf Letter, supra note 15.

48.

CBO's March 2011 Baseline: Health InsuranceExchanges, CONG. BUDGET OFFICE (Mar.

18, 2011), http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/HealthlnsuranceExchanges
.pdf.
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provide insurance to sixteen million individuals who would otherwise
be uninsured, 3.5 million who will lose their employer-sponsored
insurance, and 1.5 million who previously had unaffordable employer-

sponsored insurance. 49
Although the Committee for Economic Development deemed
the exchanges essential for successful healthcare reform, and although
the concept has support across much of the political spectrum, statelevel exchanges have "been an experiment with decidedly mixed
results" in other reform efforts.50 Many earlier attempts faltered
because of problems with adverse selection, an issue the ACA tries to
address with measures such as requiring that plans inside and outside
the exchanges play by the same rules.5 1 Also, the ACA aims to
increase participation in the exchanges by making them the only
means by which to access the tax credits. 52 Beyond shopping and
checkout, the exchanges are responsible for handling the applications
for tax credits and cost-sharing reductions offered by the federal
government. 53
C. The Addition of Federal Exchanges as a Safety Net
Under the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution, the
federal government holds some authority to regulate insurance, but it
is an area in which federal and state powers overlap. Early drafts of

the ACA envisioned that states would establish exchanges under
49.

KAISER FAMILY FOUND., A PROFILE OF HEALTH INSURANCE EXCHANGE ENROLLEES 2

(2011), availableat http://www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/8147.pdf.
50. JOST, supra note 20, at 2-3. Another concern is that exchanges may discourage states
from experimenting with alternative ways of achieving the same policy goals. Jonathan H. Adler,

Cooperation, Commandeering, or Crowding Out?: Federal Intervention and State Choices in
Health Care Policy, 20 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 199, 220 (2011).
51. E.g., Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1001,
124 Stat. 119 (2010) (banning lifetime or annual dollar limits on coverage); id. § 1201
(prohibiting exclusions for preexisting conditions); id. § 10103 (requiring plans to permit
participation in approved clinical trials and to cover routine patient costs of participation); see
also CTR. FOR CONSUMER INFO. & INS. OVERSIGHT, CMS-9989-P2, PRELIMINARY REGULATORY
IMPACT ANALYSIS: PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT; ESTABLISHMENT OF
EXCHANGES AND QUALIFIED HEALTH PLANS (CMS-9989-P) AND STANDARDS RELATED TO
REINSURANCE, RISK CORRIDORS AND RISK ADJUSTMENT (CMS-9975-P) 10 (2011), available at
http://cciio.cms.gov/resources/files/cms-9989-p2.pdf (finding that ACA provisions will work
against adverse selection); TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS JOST, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, HEALTH
INSURANCE EXCHANGES IN HEALTH CARE REFORM: LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES 27-28, 38 (2009);
JOST, supranote 20, at 3-6.

52.

But see Initial Guidance to States on Exchanges, HEALTHCARE.GOV, http://www.

healthcare.gov/law/resources/regulations/guidance-to-states-on-exchanges.html (last visited Feb.
25, 2013) (stating that tax credits and insurance reforms will reduce but not eliminate potential
for adverse selection).
53. ACA § 1411 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18081).
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section 1311(b)(1). However, despite the great flexibility that comes
from decentralization of exchange implementation and enforcement, 4
the provision's mandatory language-"[e]ach state shall ... establish
an American Health Benefit Exchange" 55-ran
afoul of the
Constitution's anti-commandeering principle. In accordance with the
framework of concurrent sovereignty, 6 Congress may not
"commandeer[ ] the legislative process of the States by directly
compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program." 5 7
Congress may, however, use positive or negative incentives to
encourage states to adopt a legislative program, as long as the scheme
is not deemed coercive, among other constitutional constraints.5 8
To address the problem posed by section 1311(b)(1), Congress
added section 1321(c), which allows a state to choose not to establish
an exchange and provides that in such a case the federal government
will establish an exchange instead.59 States that default to a federal
exchange have two structural options: (1) the federal government can
run the exchange (which will still require support from state
personnel), or (2) the state can divide responsibilities in a more
flexible "partnership" arrangement, where the state takes on
customer-service and plan-management roles while the federal
government manages the more technical parts of the exchange.60
The addition of federal exchanges as a safety net changed state
exchanges from a requirement to an option, restoring the provision's
54. A decentralized system allows for a better "fit" between a state's policies and
preferences of local residents; variations in demographics and socioeconomic conditions can alter
the ideal insurance policy for a jurisdiction. Adler, supra note 50, at 202-03; see also Kingsdale,
supra note 43, at 2149. Decisions by the state will include how many Exchanges to support and
how to make the Exchanges financially sustainable. See STATE HEALTH ACCESS DATA
ASSISTANCE CTR., supranote 42, at 1.
55. ACA § 1311(b)(1) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18031).
56. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 461 (1991) ("[T]he States retain substantial
sovereign powers under our constitutional scheme, powers with which Congress does not readily
interfere.").
57. Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981); see
also New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992).
58. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206-08 (1987) (stating that imposing
conditions on receipt of federal funds is permissible to achieve "broad policy objectives," and
outlining five potential restraints on conditional spending); see also Adler, supra note 50, at 20912 (explaining restraints on conditional spending).
59. ACA § 1321(c). HHS must establish a federally operated Exchange in states opting out
or if HHS determines on or before January 1, 2013 that the state has failed to take actions
necessary to implement the requirements of ACA. Id.
60. CTR. FOR CONSUMER INFO. & INS. OVERSIGHT, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.,
GENERAL GUIDANCE ON FEDERALLY-FACILITATED
EXCHANGES
(2012), available at
http://cciio.cms.gov/resources/files/FFEGuidanceFINALVERSION_051612.pdf- see also Nicole
Fender Fisher, State-Federal PartnershipHealth Insurance Exchanges: The Great Unknown,
FORBES, Dec. 17, 2012, at 3-5.
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constitutionality. To make this change complete, Congress should
have amended the intertwined sections of the ACA, but there was
never any update to the provision at issue in this Note-the tax credit
provision in section 1401. Through section 1401 of the ACA, which
amends section 36B of the IRC, Congress created a refundable
premium tax credit. It made this tax credit available through state
exchanges established under section 1311-with no mention of section
1321(c)'s federal exchanges. The question is whether the omission was
purposeful-perhaps it was meant as an incentive for states to set up
exchanges or perhaps it was a mistake.
As of December 2012-the initial deadline for states to notify
the federal government of their intent to set up exchanges-only
eighteen states and the District of Columbia had submitted proposals
to the HHS for approval.61 The potential lack of tax credits in the
thirty-two remaining states (which will likely default to federal
exchanges or opt for partnership exchanges) is a sleeper issue set to
wake with a vengeance. But the IRS is trying to take care of the issue
before it awakens.
D. The IRS Interpretation
The IRS is responsible for developing the regulatory framework
under which exchanges will administer the premium tax credits to
eligible insureds, pursuant to section 36B of the IRC. The statute
directs the agency to make tax credits available for applicable
taxpayers "enrolled through an Exchange established by the state
under 1311."62 However, the final rule promulgated by the IRS in May
2012 extends the availability of tax credits to those participating in
the federal exchanges established under section 1321 of the ACA. 63
This interpretation was questioned relatively early in the
rulemaking process by Utah Senator Orrin Hatch, a member of the

61.

See State Decisionsfor Creating Health InsuranceExchanges, as of February 15, 2013,

KAISER FAMILY FOUND., http://www.statehealthfacts.org/comparemaptable.jsp?ind=962&cat=17

(last visited Feb. 26, 2013); Status of State Health InsuranceExchange Implementation, CTR. ON
BUDGET & POL'Y PRIORITIES (Feb. 20, 2013), http://www.cbpp.org/files/CBPP-Analysis-on-theStatus-of-State-Exchange-Implementation.pdf.
62. ACA § 1401 (to be codified in I.R.C. § 36B(b)(2)(A)). "Applicable taxpayer" is defined as
a taxpayer whose household income is 100-400% of the federal poverty line. Id.
63. Treas. Reg. §§ 1, 602 (2012) (final regulation). A taxpayer is eligible for the credit for a
taxable year if the taxpayer is an applicable taxpayer and the taxpayer or a member of the
taxpayer's family (1) is enrolled in one or more qualified health plans through an Exchange
established under section 1311 or 1321 of the Affordable Care Act (42 U.S.C. 13031 or 42 U.S.C.
18041) and (2) is not eligible for minimum essential coverage other than coverage in the
individual market. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.36, 76 Fed. Reg. 50,934 (Aug. 17, 2011).
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U.S. Senate's Committee on Finance. Hatch wrote to the Secretary of
the Treasury Department and the IRS Commissioner in December
2011, expressing his concern that the interpretation was an "excessive
use of regulatory authority" and explaining the textual anomaly as
"the result of the highly partisan nature by which the ACA was
pushed through Congress." 64
Professor James Blumstein describes the IRS rule as a "doubleedged sword" based on its expansion of benefits to those who qualify
for tax credits administered through federal exchanges and its
potential to impose penalties on employers in states that elect not to
establish an exchange.65
The agency has not been deterred by the criticism of its
proposed rule. 6 6
III. THE ROAD TO THE COURTHOUSE

Critics of the IRS rule may complain, but, given the Agency's
refusal to change its stance between its writing of the proposed rule
and its issuance of the final rule, it appears that the only effective
venue in which to challenge and change the interpretation will be the
courthouse. The State of Oklahoma took the lead on the issue:
Attorney General Scott Pruitt filed a complaint challenging the
validity of the rule in September 2012.67 But, it is not clear whether
this complaint-or other potential challenges from large employers or
citizens in states that have opted out-will even be heard; standing is
the first hurdle to be cleared, and tax issues place unique locks on the
courthouse doors.
Usually standing is established by showing injury, causation,
and redressability. 68 Lack of injury is one problem for some potential
plaintiffs; as a general rule, there is no standing for a taxpayer to

64. Letter from Sen. Orrin G. Hatch, S. Comm. on Finance, to Timothy Geithner, Treasury
Secretary, and Douglas Shuman, IRS Comm'r (Dec. 1, 2011) [hereinafter Hatch Letter],
available at http://finance.senate.gov/newsroom/ranking/release/9id=6c2ea7e8-2a57-451c-8e02f066e8ff92f7.
65. HearingBefore the H. Subcomm. on Ways and Means, 113th Cong. 4 (2012) [hereinafter
Blumstein Testimony] (statement of James F. Blumstein, University Professor of Constitutional
Law and Health Law & Policy).
66. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.36, 76 Fed. Reg. at 50,940 (Aug. 17, 2011); see Hatch Letter, supra
note 64; infra Parts IV.A. and VI.A.
67. Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Oklahoma ex rel. Pruitt v.
Sebelius, No. 11-CIV-00030-RAW (E.D. Okla. Sept. 19, 2012), available at http://www.oag.state.
ok.us/oagweb.nsf/0/ac5276feb11b775586257a7e006f7025/$FILE/Amended%2OComplaint%20(File
%20Stamped).pdf.
68. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751-52 (1984) (discussing the standing doctrine).
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contest a tax benefit conferred upon someone else. 69 This means that
citizens in states that have elected not to establish an exchange will
lack standing to challenge the regulation.
Furthermore, the Anti-Injunction Act of 1867 precludes courts
from enjoining the collection of a tax until after it has been assessed.70
A potential plaintiff must wait until a tax takes effect to challenge the
law, since there will not be an injury as a result of the law until that
point.71 Trying to jiggle the courthouse door locks, a potential plaintiff
might look for the key in the June 2012 Supreme Court opinion on the
constitutionality of the ACA. The Court characterized the penalty
imposed under the individual mandate as a "tax," but it pointed out
that the statute describes the payment as a "penalty."72 The Court
rooted its decision not to apply the Anti-Injunction Act in Congress's
choice of label. 7 3 However, unlike the penalty imposed under the
individual mandate, the penalty imposed on employers is described in
the statute as an "assessable payment" and a "tax," keeping the AntiInjunction Act bar intact. 74
Large employers, however, may bypass these standing
problems-they can show injuries resulting from the IRS rule
extending tax credits to enrollees of both state and federal
exchanges.75 The source of their injuries is the tax imposed if they do
not offer health insurance to an employee and that employee receives
a premium or cost-sharing subsidy through an exchange, and this
potentially large injury could indeed be very strong motivation to
sue.7 6 This is the type of argument Oklahoma's Attorney General Scott
Pruitt presented in his filing. He asserted that the Final Rule will
negatively impact the State's competitive business environment and

69. See, e.g., Al-Kim, Inc. v. United States, 650 F.2d 944, 947 (9th Cir. 1979) ("Neither the
Internal [Revenue] Code nor the decisions of this court support any right of third parties to
contest the merits of a tax assessment. ... 'A tax assessment may not be collaterally attacked.' ");
see also Peter Suderman, No Insurance Subsidies Through ObamaCare's Federal Health
Exchanges?, REASON MAG. (Sept. 8, 2011), http://reason.com/blog/2011/09/08/are-federally-runhealth-excha.
70. Anti-Injunction Act of 1867, 26 U.S.C. § 7421 (2006).
71. Id.
72. Nat'1 Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2594 (2012).
73. Id.
74. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1513, 124
Stat. 119 (2010) (to be codified at I.R.C. § 4980H).
75. See Adler & Cannon, supranote 13, at 5, 64-67.
76. ACA § 1513 (to be codified at I.R.C. § 4980H). Employers are not required to offer
coverage, but if they do it must be affordable, as defined by ACA § 1401 (to be codified at I.R.C. §
36B(c)(2)(C).
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its ability to attract and retain employers.77 It remains to be seen
whether a court will allow the case to move forward.
This Part outlines possible effects of the penalty on employees
and employers before explaining how large employers, the parties who
are most likely to have standing, might structure a legal argument
against the IRS rule when it comes into operation.
A. Effect of the ACA on Employment-Based Insurance
Employment-based health insurance is currently the primary
source of coverage for Americans, and as such, it is a key building
block of the ACA. In 2010, 69% of all U.S. employers offered coverage
to employees, 78 a figure the ACA aims to increase in part by assessing
taxes on companies that decline to do so. 79
Predictions about the impact of the "play or pay" mandate vary,
but critics suggest it will result in employers dropping coverage
(precisely what the penalty is designed to discourage), partly because
making the tax payment might be less expensive than continuing to
offer coverage. 80 On the other hand, health insurance might be viewed
in some workplaces as integral to overall compensation-necessary to
attract talented employees in a competitive labor market.8 ' Regardless
of whether compensation comes in the form of a combination of wages
and benefits or simply wages, the market will arguably keep employee
compensation steady. 82
A 2011 survey found that among companies of all sizes
currently offering health insurance to employees, 76% intend to
continue doing so in January 2014, when the penalty provisions take
effect. 83 It is also telling to look to Massachusetts, where the rate of
employer-sponsored coverage increased 3% from 2006 to 2009, after
2006 health-reform legislation imposed changes similar to those in the
ACA. 84
77. Amended Complaint, supra note 67.
78. See Haberkorn, supra note 34, at 1.
79. There are also incentives for small employers: those with less than twenty-five
employees and whose average annual salary is less than $50,000 can get tax credits on employee
health premiums, available for two years. ACA § 1421(a) (to be codified at I.R.C. § 45R) (as
amended by HCERA § 10105, Pub. L. No. Law 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010)).
80.

THE KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, supra note 24.

81. Linda Blumberg et al., Why Employers Will Continue to Provide Health Insurance: The
Impact of the Affordable CareAct, 49 INQUIRY 116 (2012).
82.

Id.

83. Haberkorn, supra note 34, at 3. The same survey found that twenty-eight percent of
companies not currently offering benefits would begin to do so in January 2014. Id.
84. Id. at 5.
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Beginning in 2014, employers meeting the fifty-employee
threshold will be subject to a tax penalty of up to $2,000 per
employee85 for failing to offer "qualified" (comprehensive and
affordable)86 health insurance coverage to full-time employees and
their dependents, but only if an employee purchases coverage through
an exchange with the assistance of a federal tax credit. The ultimate
effect of the ACA on large employers may be uncertain, but there is no
doubt it will be significant.
B. Findingan Injury
Large employers can find their sticking point in the text of
section 36B of the IRC by making the plain-text argument outlined in
Part IV: a subsidy is not provided for where the individual purchases
insurance through a federal exchange. The tax assessment, found in
section 4980H(a) of the IRC, is triggered if "at least one full-time
employee ... has been certified to the [large] employer under section
1411 as having enrolled. .. in a qualified health plan with respect to
which an applicable premium tax credit or cost-sharing reduction is
allowed or paid."87 Section 1411(a)(2) prescribes the procedures for
determining eligibility for exchange participation and outlines criteria
for premium tax credits (available under ACA section 1401, which
amends section 36B) and reduced cost sharing (available under ACA
section 1402).88 A strict reading of section 36B does not make tax

credits available through federal exchanges since section 1401 does
not mention the federal exchanges provided for under section 1321.
This means that a large employer fined for not offering coverage could
challenge the fine by asserting that its employee received the tax
credit in error. This eligibility issue would provide judicial opportunity
to review the IRS rule.89
85. The penalty will be imposed for each full-time employee but, for the purposes of
calculating the assessable payment, thirty employees will not be counted. No payments will be
assessed for part-time workers. The monthly penalty assessed in 2014 will be equal to the
number of employees minus thirty, multiplied by 1/12 of $2,000. This rate will be adjusted
annually. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 1513, 1401,
124 Stat. 119 (2010) (to be codified at I.R.C. § 36B(c)); Health Care and Education Reconciliation
Act of 2010 (HCERA), Pub. L. No. Law 111-152, § 1003, 124 Stat. 1029.
86. See supra Part II.A. Employers who offer coverage that does not quality must pay a
$3000 annual assessment. ACA §§ 1513, 1401 (to be codified at I.R.C. § 36B(c)).
87. Id. § 1513(a) (to be codified at I.R.C. § 4980H(a)).
88. Id. § 1411(a)(2) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18081).

89.

See David Hogberg, Companies Could Challenge ObamaCare Employer Fines,

INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY (Sept. 16, 2011, 5:46 PM), http://news.investors.com/Article/
585053/201109161746/ObamaCare-Goof-On-Firm-Fines-.htm (quoting Tim Jost, professor at
Washington and Lee University Law School).
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The penalty imposed when an employee is eligible for reduced
cost sharing, however, is trickier to maneuver. Reduced cost sharing is
allowed for an "eligible insured" falling within the range of 100-400%
of the federal poverty line. 90 As defined by section 1402, an eligible
insured is someone in the individual market who uses an exchange to
enroll in a certain level of qualified health plan (health plans are
divided into gold, silver, bronze, and platinum levels, along with
catastrophic plans).91 The definition does not differentiate between
state and federal exchanges. Also within section 1402, however, is a
prohibition on reduced cost sharing "with respect to coverage for any
month unless the month is a coverage month with respect to which a
credit is allowed to the insured . .. under section 36B."9 2 If tax credits
are not available through federal exchanges under section 36B of the
IRC, then cost sharing is prohibited. Carried through to its logical
conclusion, a strict textual interpretation of section 36B means that an
individual enrolled in an exchange established under section 1321 of
the ACA does not qualify for either a tax credit or reduced cost
sharing.
Section 1402(f)(1) of the ACA verifies this reading of the
statute; it expressly gives any term used in section 1402 the same
meaning it is given in section 36B of the IRC. 93 Significantly, the term
"coverage month," used in section 1402(f)(2), is defined under section
36B(c)(2).9 4 Under this controlling definition, "coverage month" means
that, as of the first day of the month, an individual is insured by
virtue of being "enrolled in" a qualified health plan offered "through
an Exchange established by the State under section 1811."95 Therefore,
only coverage plans offered through state-run exchanges can fall into a
"coverage month" in which a tax credit is available. This confirms that
individuals enrolled in a federally run exchange established under
section 1321 do not qualify for reduced cost sharing.
All roads lead back to section 36B. Careful parsing of the
intertwined sections suggests that a large employer in a state with a
federal exchange should not be subject to a section 4980H penalty
because an employee receiving a subsidy or cost-sharing reduction
under a federal exchange will not trigger the liability imposed under
section 4980H. If required to pay the penalty, an employer whose

§ 1402(b)

(to be codified at 42 U.S.C.

§ 18071).

90.

ACA

91.
92.
93.

Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 18022 (2010).
ACA § 1402(f)(2) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18071) (emphasis added).
Id. § 1402(f)(1) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18071).

94.
95.

See infra Part V.A.
ACA § 1401(a) (to be codified at I.R.C.

§ 36B(c)(2)(A))

(emphasis added).
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employees receive tax credits or reduced cost sharing through a
federal exchange would suffer harm from the IRS rule, thereby
meeting the injury and causation prongs of standing. A large employer
in such a position would have both standing and motivation to
challenge the scope of the IRS rule that makes tax credits available
through federal exchanges. 96
IV. THE APPROACH: HOW A REVIEWING COURT COULD UPHOLD THE
IRS RULE

The IRS decisionmaking process will be subject to scrutiny only
if the rule is challenged in court.97 If it relies on arguments proposed
in this Note, the Agency will present a strong case for Chevron
deference, likely persuading a reviewing court that the IRS rule is an
appropriate, permissible reading of section 36B(b)(2)(A). 98
This Part begins by outlining the process the IRS used to arrive
at its final rule, pointing out that the Agency was aware of the
problems caused by the statutory gap before solidifying its
interpretation. It then discusses why tax regulations are unique. Next,
it explains the basics of the Chevron framework for judicial review of
agency action, which a court will use to address a challenge to the
IRS's interpretation of section 36B(b)(2)(A) as allowing for tax credits
through both state and federal exchanges.
A. The Setup
Regulations promulgated pursuant to a grant of authority
under a particular code section, rather than the general grant of
authority in the IRC, are considered legislative. 99 Section 36B(g) of the
96. See Jonathan H. Adler & Michael F. Cannon, Op-Ed., Another ObamaCare Glitch,
WALL ST. J. (Nov. 16, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405297020368
7504577006322431330662.html (dismissing concerns that no party would have standing to
challenge the rule by describing the penalty that employers must pay if their employees receive
premium assistance as sufficient to constitute harm).
97. See supra Part III.
98. In addition to addressing the scope of authority issue, the IRS may point out that there
is no interjurisdictional issue for money flowing from the federal purse through federal
exchanges, so it was not necessary for Congress to specifically allocate funds for these tax credits
in the text of the ACA.
99. See Ellen P. Aprill, Muffled Chevron: Judicial Review of Tax Regulations, 3 FLA. TAX
REV. 51, 55-56 (1996) (distinguishing legislative from interpretive regulations by describing the
former as creating an entirely new law and the latter as clarifying existing laws). The Secretary
of the Treasury Department has general authority to "prescribe all needful rules and regulations
for the enforcement of [the I.R.C.]." I.R.C. § 7805(a) (2006). Generally, regulations promulgated
under this general grant of authority are considered interpretative. The APA exempts
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IRC gives the Secretary of the Treasury Department authority to issue
regulations to carry out the provisions of section 36B. 00 Thus,
regulations promulgated under section 36B(g) will be considered
legislative. The Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") requires noticeand-comment procedures for this type of regulation. 101
The IRS went through the proper rulemaking process,
complying with APA standards for documents such as the proposed
rule. In response to its solicitation for comments from interested
persons, the agency received 241 comments. 102 Only two of these
comments addressed the statutory gap that is the focus of this Note.
One came from a representative of Texans Against Obamacare:
"Congress did not delegate this discretion to the IRS.

. ..

No matter

what rule the IRS comes up with, it absolutely cannot ever assume
powers granted only to Congress by The People." 103 The other came
from a citizen with similar concerns about the IRS interpretation. 104
The two comments not only raised eyebrows and questions about the
limits of the Agency's authority, they also obligated the Agency to
address its policy choice on the matter in its final rule.105
The authority of regulatory agencies is derived from delegation
by the legislature. This authority is widely accepted as appropriate
because an agency's combination of lawmaking and interpretive
responsibility can be directed, checked, and controlled by political

interpretive rules from notice-and-comment procedures. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A) (2006). The IRS
takes the position that most regulations are interpretive, not legislative, yet routinely applies the
notice-and-comment procedures required by the APA. Aprill, supra, at 57.
100. I.R.C. § 36B(g).
101. Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)-(c).
102. APA § 553(c) ('After notice ... the agency shall give interested persons an opportunity
to participate in the rule making through submission of written data, views, or arguments.");
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.36, 76 Fed. Reg. 50,934, 50,940 (Aug. 17, 2011) (comments of Brian Clark,
Texans Against ObamaCare, IRS-2011-0024-0003; Nicole Kaeding, IRS-2011-0024-0005),
available at regulations.gov.
103. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.36, 76 Fed. Reg. at 50,940 (comment of Brian Clark, Texans
Against ObamaCare, IRS-2011-0024-0003). The power to alter the tax code and spend money is
vested in Congress. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
104. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.36, 76 Fed. Reg. at 50,940 (comment of Nicole Kaeding, IRS-20110024-0005), availableat regulations.gov.
105. See Indep. U.S. Tanker Owners Comm. v. Dole, 809 F.2d 847, 852-53 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(describing the notice and comment rulemaking requirement that an agency issue a statement
that elaborates the documents, which include "findings of fact and conclusions of law"); Auto.
Parts & Accessories Ass'n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330, 337 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (explaining that the APA
requires "that the agency, after considering the relevant matter received by it in response to its
invitation of comments, 'shall incorporate in the rules adopted a concise general statement of
their basis and purpose' "); infra Part VI.A.
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branches of government. 06 An agency is confined by the power
conferred by Congress, so its authority to issue regulations is as
limited or extensive as the text of the statute. 07 Although this
remains true for the IRS, the Supreme Court has singled out the
Agency for its expertise. As articulated in Bob Jones University v.
United States, those administering the tax laws have "very broad
authority to interpret those laws." 0 8 In this case, section 36B(g)
grants the Secretary of the Treasury Department the authority to
issue regulations to implement section 36B by "prescrib[ing] such
regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this
section."109
B. Tax (Un)Exceptionalism
Tax regulations are unusual: they interpret a particularly
complex and interwoven statutory scheme that is frequently amended
by Congress.1 0 Due to the complexity of tax regulations, a specialized
Article I court hears most challenges to Treasury and IRS regulations.
Therefore, a challenge to the IRS interpretation of the tax credit issue
is likely to be heard by this Tax Court.
Although the standard of review for IRS regulations has varied
over time, the Treasury is generally afforded a great deal of deference
by courts.'11 The Supreme Court "has long recognized the primary
authority of the IRS . . . in construing the [IRC]."11 2 Its unique status
is justified by the expertise needed to understand the complexity of
the tax code and the Treasury's expansive authority. 113 In 2011, the
106. Jerry L. Mashaw, Agency Statutory Interpretation, in 2 ISSUES LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP,
art. 9, at 9 (Daniel A. Farber ed., 2002) (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council,
467 U.S. 837 (1984)).
107. See APA § 558(b) ("A sanction may not be imposed or a substantive rule or order issued
except within the jurisdiction delegated to the agency and as authorized by law.").
108. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 596 (1983).
109. I.R.C. § 36B(g) (2006). See generally Blumstein Testimony, supra note 65, at 2
(outlining institutional interests affected by the subsidy issue).
110. See generally Aprill, supra note 99, at 53 (emphasizing the voluminous and complex
nature of tax regulations).
111. Id. at 77; see also, e.g., Chevronl, 467 U.S. 837; Nat'l Muffler Dealers Ass'n, v. United
States, 440 U.S. 472, 477 (1979) (explaining that courts are to presume deference, upholding
interpretive tax regulations if reasonable, as determined by the plain language of the statute
along with its origins and purpose). But see Cent. Pa. Say. Ass'n v. Comm'r, 104 T.C. 384, 392
(1995) (suggesting that Chevron merely restated National Muffler standard "with possibly subtle
distinctions as to the role of legislative history and the degree of deference to be accorded to a
regulation").
112. Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 596.
113. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865 ("The Administrator's interpretation represents a
reasonable accommodation of manifestly competing interests and is entitled to deference: the
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Supreme Court clarified the governing standard of review for tax
regulations in Mayo Foundation for Medical Education and Research
v. United States, rejecting tax exceptionalism by stating that the
"principles underlying our decision in Chevron apply with full force in
the tax context."114 Chevron lays out the test the court applies when
an agency's authority to make a specific rule is at issue, as it is here.
C. JudicialReview: The Framework
The Chevron two-step test, allowing reasonable agency
interpretations as long as the statute has not clearly spoken to the
issue,115 is applied when Congress intended an agency's
interpretations to carry the force of law and the agency makes a
formal ruling with a "lawmaking pretense."116 Here, the IRS gave
notice, proposed regulations, and received public comment in
anticipation of issuing final regulations. Its choice of notice-andcomment procedures not only provides a safe harbor' 17 through which
it can breeze through the Chevron Step Zero test articulated in United
States v. Mead Corporation,11 but also serves as a "significant sign"
that the agency's rule merits Chevron deference. 119
regulatory scheme is technical and complex, the agency considered the matter in a detailed and
reasoned fashion, and the decision involves reconciling conflicting policies.").
114. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 713 (2011).
The Court elaborated, "we are not inclined to carve out an approach to administrative review
good for tax law only . . . we have expressly '[r]ecogniz[ed] the importance of maintaining a
uniform approach to judicial review of administrative action.' " Id. (citing Dickinson v. Zurko,

527 U.S. 150, 154 (1999)).

115. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Maine Corp., 503 U.S. 407, 417-18 (1992) ("If
the text is ambiguous and so open to interpretation in some respects, a degree of deference is
granted to the agency, though a reviewing court need not accept an interpretation which is
unreasonable.").
116. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001). In practice, however, the
Court employs a "continuum of deference regimes." William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer,
The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretationsfrom
Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1090 (2008). Furthermore, Eskridge and Baer found that
in 53.6% cases (from 1983 to 2005) the Court did not invoke any deference regime, instead
"rel[ying] on ad hoc judicial reasoning of the sort that typifies the Court's methodology in regular
statutory interpretation cases." Id. at 1090, 1099-1101.
117. See Mead, 553 U.S. at 229-30 ("We have recognized a good indicator of delegation
meriting Chevron treatment in express congressional authorizations to engage in the process of
rulemaking . . . ."); id. at 246 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (identifying the effect of the Court's ruling as
creating "more-or-less safe harbors").
118. The Mead Court established the Step Zero test: Chevron deference is appropriate
"when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules
carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated
in the exercise of that authority." Mead, 553 U.S. at 226-27. This inquiry does not turn on
whether Congress' delegation of authority was general or specific. Mayo, 131 S. Ct. at 713-14.
119. Mayo, 131 S. Ct. at 714.
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Chevron acknowledges that Congress may intend for an agency
to fill gaps in regulatory statutes based on the agency's expertiseboth the ability to handle "technical and complex" regulatory schemes
and to reconcile "competing interests."120 Indeed, because of its
complexity, the ACA might be better described as a statute conferring
authority on administrators to regulate conduct, rather than a statute
that itself is a set of norms regulating conduct. 121 Congressional
delegation of rulemaking authority determines who will make the
many policy decisions required by the statute, and how they will do
122
A challenge to an agency's construction of a statutory provision
So.
cannot turn on the wisdom of a policy, instead, it can only ask whether
the agency's choice is reasonable within the space created by
Congress.'23
According to Cass Sunstein, who served as Administrator of
the White House Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs from
2009 to 2012, when agencies resolve statutory ambiguities it is "a
question of policy as much as it is one of law . .. [and] agencies are

uniquely well situated to make the relevant policy decisions."l 24
Elaborating, Sunstein states that when the instructions of the
legislature are unclear and thus do not resolve the regulatory
problems, "[tihe resolution of the ambiguity calls for an inquiry into
something other than the instructions of the enacting legislature." 125
Still, congressional intent, if any can be discerned, is crucial: a court
will be "mindful of giving effect to broad statutory purposes or finely
tuned legislative deals."12 6
Before progressing with the analysis of whether the IRS rule
would pass the Chevron test, the regulatory structure of the ACA
120. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844, 865 (speculating that Congress "consciously desired" the
Agency to consider competing interests based on their unique level of expertise); Lisa Schultz
Bressman, Chevron's Mistake, 58 DUKE L.J. 549, 561 (2009) (citing expertise as one of a variety
of reasons that Congress may intend for agencies to "fill gaps" in regulatory statutes).

121. Gary S. Lawson, Reviving Formal Rulemaking: Openness and Accountability for
Obamacare,THE HERITAGE FOUND. 2 (July 25, 2011), http://report.heritage.org/bg2585 ("Passing
the bill did not tell us what is it in it; it simply began the process by which law under it will
emerge."); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 37 (James Madison) ("All new laws, though penned with
the greatest technical skill, and passed on the fullest and most mature deliberation, are
considered more or less obscure and equivocal, until their meaning be liquidated and ascertained
by a series of particular . . . adjudications.").

122. CURTIS W. COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41180, REGULATIONS PURSUANT TO
THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 2 (P.L. 111-148) (2010).
123. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 866
124. Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071,
2085-86 (1990).
125. Id.
126. Bressman, supranote 120, at 562.
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should be highlighted. The structure is unusual in that over forty
provisions require, permit, or contemplate rulemaking by federal
agencies to implement the statute.127 This fragmented delegation
means that the various agencies will tackle different aspects of the
larger health-reform effort, each drawing upon their institutional
expertise.128 Most regulatory schemes, in contrast, vest rulemaking,
enforcement, and adjudicative powers in a single administrative
agency. 129 Can Chevron deference apply when multiple agencies have
authority to implement a statute? 130 The answer depends on the
specifics of the statute: application of the doctrine makes the most
sense when Congress explicitly delegates interpretive or legislative
power to one specific agency. 131 By looking to what authority Congress
intended to delegate to the agency, a reviewing court is essentially
adhering to the logic of Mead Step Zero. 132
The ACA presents a case of what Professors Freeman and
Rossi deem "related jurisdictional assignment," meaning that
Congress assigned "closely related but distinct roles to numerous
agencies" in a larger regulatory regime. 133 The primary administrative
authority responsible for implementing the ACA is the Secretary of

127. CURTIS W. COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41180, REGULATIONS PURSUANT TO
THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 2 (P.L. 111-148) (2010); see also FTC v.
Ken Roberts Co., 276 F.3d 583, 593 (D.C. Cir. 2001) ("[W]e live in 'an age of overlapping and
concurring regulatory jurisdiction.'" (internal citation omitted)).

128. See Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordinationin Shared Regulatory Space, 125
HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1135 (2012) ("Fragmented delegations create situations in which different
agencies possess the authority necessary to tackle different aspects of a larger problem.").
129. See Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n., 499 U.S. 144, 151 (1991)
(describing the most common regulatory regime as one that involves a single agency exercising
rulemaking, enforcement, and adjudicatory powers).
130. See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristen E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833,
849 n.85 (2001) (explaining that, before Chevron, administration of a statute by multiple
agencies was sometimes considered a reason for reduced deference, but that the Court has not
yet resolved the issue under Chevron); William R. Weaver, Note, Chevron's Multiple Agency

Problem: Why the Traditional Chevron Framework Is Inadequate for Judicial Review of Joint
Rules Promulgated by CoordinatedAgencies, 67 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014).
131. See generally Daniel Lovejoy, Note, The Ambiguous Basis for Chevron Deference:
Multiple-Agency Statutes, 88 VA. L. REV. 879, 901-13 (2002) (discussing role of Chevron's
doctrinal basis in deciding whether to defer).

132. Id. at 914; see also Jacob E. Gersen, Overlapping and Underlapping Jurisdiction in
Administrative Law, 2006 Sup. CT. REV. 201, 219-20 (suggesting that questions of shared
jurisdiction are best approached using the Step Zero inquiry).
133. Freeman & Rossi, supra note 128, at 1145. The Americans with Disabilities Act
("ADA"), for example, delegates authority to issue regulations to various administrative
authorities including the Equal Opportunity Employment Commission (implements Title I), the
Attorney General (implements Title II), and the Secretary of Transportation (implements parts
of Titles II and III). Lovejoy, supra note 131, at 907-08 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 12116, 12134(a),
12149(a) (2006)).
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the HHS, though the Secretary does not have general authority over
the entire statute. Section 1401 specifically grants authority to the
Secretary of the Treasury to administer section 36B of the IRC. 134 A
court will certainly keep the HHS and IRS roles distinct for the
purposes of Chevron deference, 135 though interagency coordination
may be desirable. 136 Since the Court has conclusively stated that
Chevron is the appropriate framework for judicial review of IRS
regulations and the IRS is operating under a specific grant of
authority, the next Part analyzes the IRS rule under the Chevron twostep test.
V. CHEVRON STEP ONE: MIND THE GAP
Existing under the constraints of the nondelegation doctrine,
the primary role of an agency is to be a "faithful agent" of Congress,
despite the location of agencies in the executive branch of
government. 137 Because the Agency can act only within the limits
Congress prescribes in its authority-conferring statute, the IRS is
charged with interpreting section 36B to determine its task and the
limits of its rulemaking authority.
Under Chevron, the court first asks "whether Congress has
directly spoken to the precise question at issue," using the "traditional
tools of statutory construction" to guide the inquiry. 138 An analysis of
the IRS's decision to include federal exchanges in the IRS subsidy rule
reveals section 36B(b)(2) is hardly as straightforward as it first seems.
Several of the traditional tools applied in Step One of the inquiry
weigh in favor of acknowledging the ambiguity inherent in the statute.
A. The Plain Text
The threshold question is whether the plain text of the statute
is ambiguous. A court will find ambiguity only when a provision is
134. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1401(a), 124
Stat. 119 (2010) (to be codified at I.R.C. § 36B(g)).
135. See Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 262-63 (2006) (stating that ambiguous general
authority will not be interpreted broadly when the statute contains specific grants of authority).
136. See generally Freeman & Rossi, supra note 128, at 1145-55 (discussing interagency
dynamics, promoting interagency coordination, and calling for a departure from the singleagency focus of administrative law).
137. Jerry L. Mashaw, Between Facts and Norms: Agency Statutory Interpretation as an
Autonomous Enterprise,55 U. TORONTO L.J. 497, 502-03 (2005).
138. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 & n.9 (1984).
See generally LISA SCHULTZ BRESSMAN ET AL., THE REGULATORY STATE 188-316 (2010)
(exploring text-based and purpose-based tools of statutory interpretation at length).
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"reasonably or fairly susceptible of different interpretations" or may
have multiple meanings.139
Section 36B(b)(2) of the statute reads:
The premium assistance amount determined under this subsection with respect to any
coverage month is the amount equal to the lesser of(A) the monthly premiums for such month for 1 or more qualified health plans offered in
the individual market within a State which cover the taxpayer, the taxpayer's spouse, or
any dependent (as defined in section 152) of the taxpayer and which enrolled in through
an Exchange established by the State under 1311 of the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act, or
(B) the excess (if any) of(i) the adjusted monthly premium for such month for the applicable second lowest cost
silver plan with respect to the taxpayer, over
(ii) an amount equal to 1/12 of the product of the applicable percentage and the
40
taxpayer's household income for the taxable year.1

Are the words of section 36B(b)(2)(A) susceptible to more than
one meaning?141 The plain language of section 36B(b)(2)(A) makes
available a tax credit for certain taxpayers "enrolled through an
Exchange established by the state under 1311."142 To make tax credits
available in states not electing to establish an exchange, the IRS
expanded the statute, reading it to effectively say "an Exchange
established under 1311 or 1321." Thus, the IRS stepped beyond the
text when writing the proposed rule, inferring meaning outside of
Congress's chosen words.
A cursory reading of section 36B(b)(2) suggests that the text
might be understood another way, as it provides that the amount of
the tax credit shall be the lesser of two options. Option one, section
36B(b)(2)(A), references state exchanges but is silent on the subject of
federal exchanges. 143 The second option, section 36B(b)(2)(B), does not
mention either section 1311 or section 1321 exchanges. 144 One might
jump to the conclusion that the tax credit amount provided through
federal exchanges will always be determined under section
36B(b)(2)(B).

139. Rhone-Poulenc Basic Chem. Co. v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 616 A.2d 1192, 1196 (Del.
1992).
140. ACA § 1401 (to be codified in I.R.C. § 36B(b)(2)).
141. See generally Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 (explaining that when a court constructs an
agency's interpretation of a statute it must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress); Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 616 A.2d at 1196 (explaining that if a contract is clear and
unambiguous then the parties will be bound by its meaning).
142. ACA § 1401 (to be codified in I.R.C. § 36B) (emphasis added).

143. Id.
144. Id.

1284

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66:4:1259

However, a careful interpretation recognizes that the term
"coverage month" modifies both 36B(b)(2)(A) and (B). This term, which
is defined in section 36B(c)(2), requires enrollment in a qualified
health plan offered "through an Exchange established by the State
under section 1311."145 Therefore, only coverage plans offered through
state-run exchanges can fall into a "coverage month" in which a tax
credit is available, so individuals enrolled in a federally run exchange
established under section 1321 do not qualify for the tax credit.
This is where the critics of the IRS rule hang their hats. 146 If
legislative purpose is expressed in unambiguous language, application
of the plain-meaning rule bars courts from relying on legislative
history to discern the meaning of the statute. 147 If the court ascertains
through use of the traditional tools of statutory interpretation "that
Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue, that
intention is the law and must be given effect."148 Critics also rely on
the expressio unius canon (the mention of one thing is the exclusion of
the other)149 to argue that section 36B(b)(2)(A) only provides for tax
credits through state exchanges. 150
The IRS may counter these criticisms in various ways. To start,
the IRS can support its position by highlighting the Supreme Court's
assertion that ambiguity "is a creature not just of definitional
possibilities but also of statutory context. That may be so even if
statutory language is highly technical."11 Admittedly, the plain
meaning of the text is the most authoritative evidence-but a court
will rarely come to a full stop without checking other contextual
145. Id.; see also supra Part III.B (explaining a large employer would have both standing
and motivation to challenge the scope of IRS regulation that makes tax credits available through
federal Exchanges).
146. E.g., Blumstein Testimony, supra note 65.
147. See Adler & Cannon, supra note 12, at 55-59 (arguing against ambiguity). See
generally YULE KIM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 97-589, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: GENERAL
PRINCIPLES AND RECENT TRENDS 39-42 (2008) (describing the plain meaning rule).
148. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 448 (1987) (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843, n.9 (1984)).
149. See Barnhart v. Peabody Coal, 537 U.S. 149, 168 (2003) ("[E]xpressiounius est exclusio
alterius only has force when the items expressed are members of an 'associated group or series,'
justifying the inference that items not mentioned were excluded by deliberate choice, not
inadvertence.").
150. See Blumstein Testimony, supra note 65, at 3, 5 (invoking expressio unius est exclusio
alterius to argue "the ACA's granting of subsidies for income-qualified enrollees under state
exchanges established under Section 1311 is to be construed not to grant comparable subsidies
for income-qualified enrollees under federal exchanges established under Section 1321").
151. Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep't of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 83 (2007) (internal citation
omitted) (analyzing a statute that used technical statistical language); see also FDA v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132-33 (2000) (analyzing statutory context to
determine ambiguity); Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994).
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evidence. 152 In practice, courts often reach beyond the text, albeit
inconsistently.153 For example, in California v. American Stores Co.,
the Court found the plain meaning of a provision of the Clayton Act to
be clear, yet considered legislative history in its analysis.154
Continuing to analyze the plain text at issue, the IRS can
emphasize that section 36B(b)(2)(A) does not exclude federal
exchanges from the tax credit scheme. The expressio unius canon is
not to be applied to infer deliberate exclusion of an item (here, the
federal exchanges) by Congress when only one item is mentioned
(here, the state exchanges).155 The Court explained in Barnhart v.
Peabody Coal that expressio unius "has force only when the items
expressed are members of an 'associated group of series,' justifying the
inference that items not mentioned were excluded by deliberate
choice, not inadvertence." 5 6
Further, the canon is not to be employed "unless it is fair to
suppose that Congress considered the unnamed possibility and meant
to say no to it."157 Thus, the canon's operation is further tempered by
the Court's recognition that "as always, the soundness of [the canon's]
premise is a function of timing."15 8 Here, Congress drafted section
1401 of the ACA to provide for tax credits through state exchanges
before it added section 1321 to sidestep commandeering concerns. The
omission of federal exchanges from section 1401 was not intentional;
common sense suggests that it resulted from drafting a mammoth
statute in a way that was hardly chronological. The timeline shows
that there was no "good reason" for Congress to consider adding
federal exchanges to the text at the time of drafting, and the Court's
precedent indicates that "if there was no reason to consider [the item],

152. Eskridge & Baer, supra note 116, at 1090. But cf. William N. Eskridge Jr., America's
Statutory 'constitution,' 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 38 (2007) (criticizing the court for following an
"excessively mechanical" approach to agency deference by allowing plain text to trump agency
interpretations that give effect to statutory purpose).
153. Compare Davis v. Mich. Dept. of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 808 (1989), with California v.
Am. Stores Co., 495 U.S. 271, 285 (1990) (considering legislative history despite Court's belief
that statutory language was unambiguous, because appellate court did so), and United States v.
Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543-44 (1940).
154. California,495 U.S. at 285.
155. See Barnhart v. Peabody Coal, 537 U.S. 149, 168 (2003); BRESSMAN ET AL., supra note
138, at 218. But see Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 81 (2002) (stating the canon
"depends on identifying a series of two or more terms or things that should be understood to go
hand in hand, which is abridged in circumstances supporting a sensible inference that the term
left out must have been meant to be excluded").
156. 537 U.S. at 168.

157. Id.
158. United Dominion Indus. v. United States, 532 U.S. 822, 836 (2001).
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then its omission would mean nothing."159 Therefore, the statutory
text that specifically makes tax credits available through state
exchanges should not preclude application of the provision to their
federal counterparts. 16 0
At this point, it is prudent to note the difference between
construing a law charitably and rewriting it-exercising "will instead of
judgment," as Alexander Hamilton put it.161 There is potential danger
that courts will take upon themselves the power to rewrite
legislation-so that people may be governed by legislation in a form
that elected officials never approved and that might be difficult to
repeal.162 A normative discussion about whether courts should engage
in cleaning up sloppy statutory drafting is beyond the scope of this
Note.
However, Chevron can allow for a certain amount of charitable
construction. Going beyond a strict textualist reading gives effect to
the Court's acknowledgement of the realities of the regulatory state as
expressed in the text of the Chevron opinion: the power of an agency to
implement and manage a congressionally created program
''necessarily requires the formulation of policy and the making of rules
to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress." 163
Accordingly, the inquiry should continue beyond the bare-minimum
textual analysis.
B. The Broader Statutory Context
Looking to the statute as a whole, 164 a court might interpret
section 36B(b)(2)(A) in the broader context of not only section 36B, but
also the IRC and the ACA. Ambiguity is a matter of statutory
159. Id.
160. Cf. Barnhart, 537 U.S. at 163 ("[Wle draw a conclusion on the grounds of plausibility: if
Congress had meant to set a counterintuitive limit on authority to act, it would have said more
than it did... .").
161. Nat'l Fed'n Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2650-52 (2012) (Scalia, Kennedy,
Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting) ("But we cannot rewrite the statute to be what it is not.
Although this Court will often strain to construe legislation so as to save it against constitutional
attack, it must not and will not carry this to the point of perverting the purpose of a statute or
judicially rewriting it." (internal quotations omitted)); THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander
Hamilton).
162. See Neal K. Katyal, In Health Care Ruling, A Pyrrhic Victory, N.Y. TIMES
(June 28, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/29/opinionlin-health-care-ruling-a-pyrrhicvictory.html?_r-1& ("By opening new avenues for the courts to rewrite the law, the federal
government may have won the battle but lost the war.").
163. 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
164. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 51 (1987) (stating that the court 'look[s]
to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy," rather than a single sentence).
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construct, not merely definitional possibilities.16 5 In the effort to
discern the purpose of a statute, meaning can be shaped by a statute's
definitions, statement of purposes, relationship to other statutes, and
overall structure. A court might find the same term or concept in a
different context that clarifies the term's meaning, or it might find
that the substantive effect of a potential definition is incompatible
with the rest of the law.166
The title of an act or provision can shed light on meaning by
providing an anchor of sorts in a statutory scheme. It can confirm an
interpretation, but does not have controlling weight.167 The title of
section 36B, "Refundable Credit for Coverage Under a Qualified
Health Plan," weighs in favor of finding ambiguity. It is not just state
exchanges that deal with qualified health plans, but federal exchanges
as well. 68 Had Congress intended to exclude federal exchanges from
the section's application, it may have been more clear from the title.
Section 1321 provides another anchoring point: when the IRS's
proposed rule is evaluated against this provision, one might
understand that Congress intended the federal exchange to be
interchangeable with those established by the states. Instead of saying
that the Secretary will establish an exchange or a federal exchange if
a state fails to establish its own, Congress said that the Secretary will
establish "such Exchange within the State." 69 This can be read as
equating federal exchanges to those established under section 1311.
Bolstering this argument is the fact that section 36B(b)(2)(A) is
not the only place that the legislature referenced section 1311 alone,
without section 1321. For example, exchanges established under
section 1311 can collect social security numbers,170 must inform
individuals of Medicaid eligibility, and if the exchange determines an
individual is eligible, must enroll that individual in Medicaid. 17'
Further, the IRC was modified to note that the term "qualified
165. See Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 158 (1990) ("In determining the meaning
of the statute, we look not only to the particular statutory language, but to the design of the
statute as a whole and to its object and policy.").
166. United Say. Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988); see
also McCarthy v. Bronson, 500 U.S. 136, 139 (1991) ("[S]tatutory language must always be read
in its proper context.").
167. See Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 462 (1892); see also BRESSMAN
ET AL., supra note 138, at 231-32 (explaining that titles can facilitate statutory interpretation
but that they are not determinative).
168. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1301(a),
124 Stat. 119 (2010) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18021).
169. Id. § 1321(c); Suderman, supranote 69.
170. Id. § 1414(a) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 405).
171. Id. § 1311(d)(4)(F) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18031).
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benefit" does not include a section 1311 exchange plan. 7 2 None of
these three provisions reference federal exchanges. Indeed, the only
place in the ACA that refers to section 1321 exchanges, despite myriad
references to section 1311 exchanges, is the information-sharing
requirement in section 36B, which was added by postenactment
legislation.173 This is strong support for the argument that federal
exchanges are meant to be a direct substitute for state exchangesotherwise, the statute would be severely lacking in instruction on
what the federal exchanges can and cannot do.
The omission of federal exchanges from section 36B can also be
analyzed under the canon of statutory silence. 174 Congressional silence
might intentionally rule out a particular understanding of the statute.
Alternatively, it might indicate Congress believed nothing more
needed to be said to effectuate its purpose, or it might suggest
Congress did not consider the matter at all. 175 When a provision is
viewed against the backdrop of the entire statute, silence may be
audible.176

The omission of federal exchanges from the tax credit scheme
established in section 36B(b)(2)(A) was probably not an intentional
exclusion by Congress, and this becomes evident when the provision is
analyzed in light of subsequent legislation.177 It is likely that a
decision of such significance to taxpayers would spur debate over the
bill by their representatives. This suggests Congress did not consider
the matter; most likely section 36B(b)(2)(A) was simply overlooked
after section 1321 was added to the ACA.
However, it is important to note that intentional omission is
also plausible. Congress might have left out federal exchanges from
the tax credit scheme in order to incentivize the establishment of state
exchanges. 78 The federal government clearly wants states to establish
exchanges, as evidenced by the directive language in section 1311
("shall ... establish an Exchange")179 that required the addition of
section 1321 to sidestep violation of the anti-commandeering principle.
172. Id. § 1515(a) (to be codified at I.R.C.
173. See infra Part V.D.

§ 125(f)(3)(A)).

174. YULE KIM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 97-589, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: GENERAL
PRINCIPLES AND RECENT TRENDS 16 (2008).

175. See Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129, 136 (1991) (internal citations omitted).
176. Elkins v. Moreno, 435 U.S. 647, 666 (1978) (stating that the lack of reference to an
immigrant's intent to remain a citizen of a foreign country is "pregnant" when contrasted with
other sections of the "comprehensive and complete" immigration code).
177. See infra Part V.D.
178. See Adler & Cannon, supra note 12, at 41-42.
179. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1311(a), 124
Stat. 119 (2010) (emphasis added).
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If tax credits are not available through federal exchanges, citizens will
probably push for their state to run an exchange, creating internal
political pressure. Scholar Jonathan Adler suggests that the statutory
omission could be "an attempt made by members of Congress who
were going to use everything short of unconstitutional compulsion to
induce states to create Exchanges."180 This approach is comparable to
the threat imposed by the Clean Air Act: a state that fails to adopt a
sufficiently strict pollution program will lose federal highway funds.181
Alternatively, some might argue that Congress delegated to the"
IRS the decision of whether to funnel tax credits through federal
exchanges. In this way, Congress could avoid what would likely be a
contentious issue, sidestepping or delaying the battle over availability
of tax credits in order to obtain consensus on the bill. 182 Purposefully
imposing ambiguity in the statute could have been a way to create
uncertainty about the legislative median's position, which makes
possible a more favorable outcome than a statute that explicitly
withholds tax credits.183 For example, Professor James Blumstein
outlined a "plausible argument that the distinction between [federal
and state exchanges] serves valid federalism and state autonomy
goals."184
However, the "too big" doctrine points out that Congress does
not "hide elephants in mouseholes." 185 The Court in FDA v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp. relied on this principle when it interpreted
the words "drugs" and "devices" in the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act,18 6 deciding that the authority of the FDA to regulate tobacco
products could not be found in its mandates to assure safety and to
work toward public health goals. The Court reasoned that "Congress

180. Hogberg, supra note 89.
181. Jonathan H. Adler, The IRS Wants to Give Tax Creditsfor Health InsurancePurchases
Beyond Those Provided for the ACA, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Sept. 9, 2011, 11:43 AM),
http://volokh.com/2011/09/09/the-irs-wants-to-give-tax-credits-for-health-insurance-purchases.
beyond-those-provided-for-in-the-acal (referencing the Clean Air Act of 1963, 42 U.S.C. § 7401
(2006)).
182. See Bressman, supra note 120 (explaining why Congress might choose, strategically, to
delegate certain issues).
183. See John R. Wright, Ambiguous Statutes and JudicialDeference to FederalAgencies, 22
J. THEORETICAL POL. 217, 218, 235 (2010).

184. Blumstein Testimony, supra note 65, at 5 ("Under the statutory terms of the ACA,
states choose the proper balance between access to subsidies for medical insurance for its
residents, on the one hand, and competitive advantage for its businesses, on the other
hand. . . .").
185. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001).
186. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 126, 129 (2000) (construing
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 321(g)-(h), 393).
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could not have intended to delegate a decision of such economic and
political significance to an agency in so cryptic a fashion."s 7
Likewise, making tax credits available through federal
exchanges is a major, fundamental issue with great economic and
political significance. No other provision of the ACA indicates that
Congress wanted to withhold tax credits from individuals purchasing
health insurance through a federal exchange. It is unlikely that
Congress would have made such a major move or delegated such
interpretive authority to the IRS without expressly stating such an
intention. 88 This analysis is comparable to that in Church of
Scientology of California v. IRS, where the Court held that it was
unlikely Congress adopted an amendment that would alter "the basic
thrust" of the statute at issue without a description by the bill's
sponsor to that effect and with such ready acceptance as it received.189
As a trump card, critics of the IRS rule may point out that the
rule goes beyond conferring a benefit for social good-it
simultaneously imposes a penalty on employers of the tax credit
recipients. Unlike a tax credit that has a cost diffused among
taxpayers who contribute to the common pot, the detriment of the tax
penalty is laid directly on employers. The IRS finds strong footing,
however, in the grant of authority found in section 36B(g): the
Secretary of the Treasury "shall prescribe such regulations as may be
necessary to carry out the provisions of this section." 90 By using
notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures, the IRS afforded
employers an opportunity to be heard and addressed their concerns. 91
Ultimately, the ambiguous title of section 36B, the text of
section 1321 equating federal exchanges with those established by the
state, and the application of the "too big" doctrine all suggest
ambiguity in the seemingly plain text of section 36B(b)(2)(A). Thus,
the scale tips toward recognizing that Congress intended tax credits to
be distributed through both federal and state exchanges.

187. Id. at 160.
188. See MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 231 (1994) (finding it
highly unlikely that Congress would delegate to an agency the determination of whether an
industry will be substantially rate-regulated).
189. Church of Scientology of Cal. v. IRS, 484 U.S. 9, 17-18 (1987) (describing this as a case
in which the "dog ... didn't bark").
190. I.R.C. § 36B(g) (2006).
191. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 237-40 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(characterizing the majority holding as creating, in cases when congressional authorization is
unclear, a practical "safe harbor" for agencies that use notice-and-comment rulemaking); see also
infra Part VI.A.
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C. Legislative History and CongressionalReports
Although reliance on legislative history is controversial, 192
there is "clear evidence that where Chevron is invoked, legislative
history remains relevant to the two-step inquiry."193 An empirical
study found reference to or reliance on legislative history in over 60%
of cases in which the Supreme Court applied Chevron.194 Consistent
with judicial acceptance of legislative history is scholar Jerry L.
Mashaw's suggestion that "[i]n some instances only the skillful
deployment of legislative history will permit agencies to fulfill their
as faithful agents in the statute's
role
constitutional
95
implementation."'
A search of multiple databases reveals the legislative record is
sparse on the issue of applicability of tax credits to federal
exchanges. 96 But, a letter from House members, the House and
Senate bills, and postenactment reports from the CBO, all support a
finding of ambiguity in section 36(b)(2)(A). This Section proceeds by
examining each of these pieces of legislative history.
A letter from House members leads this analysis. In early
2010, a group of Democratic House members from Texas, a state
vocally opposed to the health-reform bill, wrote to President Obama.
They expressed concern that Texas would not establish a state
exchange, leaving residents with no way to benefit from the ACA.' 97
They urged the President to preserve the House approach (which
included only a federal exchange, not state exchanges) in the final bill.
These House members likely believed tax credits to be unavailable in
states electing not to establish exchanges, as the plain text in the

192. Compare United States v. Great N. Ry., 287 U.S. 144, 154 (1932) ("In aid of the process
of construction we are at liberty, if the meaning be uncertain, to have recourse to the legislative
history. . . ."), with Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 147-48 (1994) ("[W]e do not resort to
legislative history to cloud a statutory text that is clear.").
193. Eskridge & Baer, supranote 116, at 1091. But see Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70,
76 n.3 (1984) (" 'Resort to legislative history is only justified where the face of the Act is
inescapably ambiguous . . . .'" (quoting Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S.
384, 396 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring))).
194. See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 116, at 1096-97, 1136 (reporting empirical findings
and noting that 62.3% of cases applying Chevron reference some legislative history).
195. Mashaw, supra note 106, at 8. Mashaw then wonders how far this line of thinking
should extend. Id.
196. The author searched the following databases on January 26, 2013: WestlawNext,
FDsys: GPO's Federal Digital System, and THOMAS.
197. Rovner, supra note 42.
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Senate bill and enacted legislation suggests. 198 Despite the awareness
of these House members, the lack of debate on the availability of tax
credits through federal exchanges pushes back toward a finding of
ambiguity. The lack of debate makes it less likely that House
members purposely excluded section 1321 exchanges from section
36B(b)(2)(A).
Next, the CBO's postenactment reports shed further light on
Congress's understanding of how exchanges would operate. Analysis
presented in a March 2011 report that considered the effects of
insurance-coverage provisions of the ACA is one example. 199 The CBO
report, which estimated the number of unsubsidized exchange
enrollees from 2014-2021, either failed to recognize that some states
might not establish an exchange or assumed the tax credits would be
triggered anyway. 200
Alongside the March 2011 CBO report, a blog post from CBO
Director Douglas W. Elmendorf acknowledged, "[E]stimates depend on
myriad projections of economic and technical factors, as well as on
assumptions about the behavioral responses to federal policies by
families, businesses, and other levels of government." 20 1 However, in
the section of his statement before the House entitled "Uncertainty
Surrounding the Estimates," he failed to mention uncertainty about
the number of states establishing an exchange and how that might
affect the number of people who might be eligible for tax credits. 202 If
the CBO understood that states would lose access to tax credits for
citizens by declining to establish an exchange, as some states already
have, it seems this would have been a significant source of uncertainty

198. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1401, 124
Stat. 119 (2010) (to be codified at I.R.C. § 36B) (directing the IRS to establish tax credits for
taxpayers "enrolled through an Exchange established by the State under 1311" of the ACA).
199. Health Insurance Exchanges: CBO's March 2012 Baseline, CONG. BUDGET OFFICE (Mar.
13, 2012), http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/43057_HealthInsurance
Exchanges.pdf.
200. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 199; CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 48; CONG.
BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 36; Letter from Douglas W. Elmendorf, Director, Congressional
Budget Office, to the Honorable Nancy Pelosi, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives (Mar. 18,
2010), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/113xx/doc11355/hr4872.pdf (scoring the premium
tax credits assuming they would occur in every state); see also Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Yes, the
Federal Exchange Can Offer Premium Tax Credits, HEALTH REFORM WATCH (Sept. 11, 2011),
http://www.healthreformwatch.com/2011/09/11/yes-the-federal-Exchange-can-offer-premium-taxcredits/ ("None of the CBO reports scoring the ACA suggest that premium tax credits would only
be available though [sic] 1311 state exchanges and not through 1321 federal exchanges.").
201. Douglas W. Elmendorf, Testimony on Last Year's Major Health Care Legislation, CONG.
BUDGET OFF. (Mar. 30, 2011, 12:25 pm), http://www.cbo.gov/publication/25155.
202. CBO's Analysis of the Major Health Care Legislation Enacted in March 2010, supra
note 38, at 9.
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worthy of mentioning due to its potentially dramatic effects on
government spending.
In the same March 2011 report, the CBO committed to update
its estimates as various economic and technical changes occurred. 203
The CBO explained that new flows of spending created through the
ACA, "such as outlays for the subsidies provided through the
insurance exchanges," are tracked separately from provisions that
affect existing flows of spending or revenues, such as Medicare
outlays. 204 As individual states made it clear that they would not
establish state exchanges, one would have expected the CBO to update
its estimates on the amount the federal government would pay out in
tax credits (a new flow of spending), but it has not done so.
Weighing against these initial conclusions from the March
2011 report, however, is an April 2011 cost estimate found in House
Resolution 1213.206 In this document, the CBO specifies that its
estimate of the number of people receiving tax credits through the
exchanges under the ACA is based in part on the assumption that
most states will establish their own exchanges by 2014.206 This
assumption was unnecessary if tax credits will be available through
both state and federal exchanges.
Legislative history and postenactment reports of the CBO tug
in both directions, but these documents at least support the view that
Congress probably did not purposely exclude federal exchanges from
tax credits administered under section 1401.
D. PostenactmentLegislation
Legislation that was enacted just four days after the ACA (the
Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010) drives home
the understanding that Congress intended taxpayers to be able to
access credits through both state and federal exchanges. 207 The proper
analysis begins with the in pari materia canon of construction. This
canon aids in resolution of statutory ambiguities by recognizing that
203. Id. at 10.
204. Id.
205. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, COST ESTIMATE, H.R. 1213: A BILL TO REPEAL MANDATORY
FUNDING PROVIDED TO STATES IN THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT TO
ESTABLISH AMERICAN HEALTH BENEFIT EXCHANGES 3 (2011), available at http://www.cbo.gov/
ftpdocs/121xx/docl2l58/hrl2l3.pdf.
206. Id.
207. Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 (HCERA) § 1004(c), Pub. L. No.
Law 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (to be codified at I.R.C. § 36B(o); see Jost, supra note 200 (arguing
that Section 1004 of HCERA demonstrates congressional understanding that the "federal
exchanges would administer premium tax credits").
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statutes that are in pari materia (relating to the same subject) usually
should be construed together. 208
This canon is at its strongest when the statutes in question
were enacted by the same legislative body at the same time. 209 For
example, the Court employed the in pari materia canon in construing
the Farm Loan Act, reading it together with the Revenue Act of 1916,
which was enacted during the same congressional session. 210 In doing
so, the Court explained that "[t]he later act can ... be regarded as a
legislative interpretation of the earlier act in the sense that it aids in
ascertaining the meaning of the words." 211
The Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act ("HCERA")
of 2010 was enacted by the same Congress and during the same
session as the ACA. Section 1004 of the HCERA amended section
36B(b)(f) of the ACA to require state and federal exchanges to report
data on tax credits to the IRS. 2 12 Reading section 36B(b)(2)(A) together
with section 1004 of the HCERA is probative of the meaning of the
earlier statute and shows Congress envisioned that both state and
federal exchanges would administer tax credits-just as the IRS
prescribes in its final rule. 213
Weighing against this argument is the presumption of
intentionality when particular language is omitted in one section and
included in another. 214 However, this presumption can be overcome. In
United States v. Wilson, for example, the Court refused to find
significance in the deletion of a reference to the Attorney General,
explaining that the reference "was simply lost in the shuffle" of a

208. See Wachovia Bank v. Schmidt, 546 U.S. 303, 315-16 (2006) ("[U]nder the in pari
materia canon, statutes addressing the same subject matter generally should be read 'as if they
were one law.' " (citations omitted)); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 361 (3d ed. 2006); see also
Erlenbaugh v. United States, 409 U.S. 239, 243-44 (1972) (providing a consistent description of
the canon); BRESSMAN ET AL., supra note 138, at 232-35 (describing the in pari materiacanon as
within the category of "whole code canons").
209. See Erlenbaugh, 409 U.S. at 244 ("[The rule's application certainly makes the most
sense when the statutes were enacted by the same legislative body at the same time."); see also
BRESSMAN ET AL., supra note 138, at 234 (discussing Erlenbaughv. United States).
210. United States v. Stewart, 311 U.S. 60, 64 (1940).
211. Id.
212. HCERA § 1004(c) (to be codified at I.R.C. § 36B(f)). "Congress understood that tax
credits would come through both state and federal Exchanges... . At the very least it creates an
ambiguity in the law that the IRS can resolve through its rule-making power." Hogberg, supra
note 89.
213. Treas. Reg. §§ 1, 602 (2012).
214. Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) ("[Where] Congress includes
particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it
is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion
or exclusion.").
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comprehensive statutory revision. 215 Similarly, in the case of section
36B(b)(2)(A), a commonsense reading overcomes the presumption that
the omission signals the intentional exclusion of federal exchanges; it
would be nonsensical to impose tax credit reporting requirements on
exchanges not permitted to administer tax credits.
It is again illustrative to analogize to FDA v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., in which the Court recognized that
subsequent legislation effectively ratified or confirmed the FDA's
earlier repeated statements that it lacked authority to regulate
tobacco. 216 In FDA v. Brown, Congress had affirmatively acted to
address the issue of tobacco regulation, going beyond mere
acquiescence to the FDA's interpretation by creating a regulatory
scheme. 217 And again, in the case of section 36B(b)(2)(A), the effect of
subsequent legislation on statutory interpretation is particularly
potent because the same Congress enacted both the ACA and the
HCERA. 218 Further, the IRS's proposed rule interpreting the ACA was
issued months after the amendment by the HCERA, meaning the
Agency could rely on the subsequent legislation to clarify
congressional intent.
A counterargument is that a reporting requirement, such as
HCERA section 1004, does not have the same economic significance as
opening the federal purse to provide a tax credit, or as imposing a
penalty on employers who do not comply with statutory
requirements. 219 Because the Constitution grants the power to tax and
spend to Congress alone, 220 legislators should be careful to clearly
state their intent to delegate this power. A court might consider

215. United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 336 (1992).
216. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 143-56 (2000) (reviewing
Congressional activity around tobacco regulation over a span of thirty-five years-including acts
subsequent to the Federal Food, Drugs, and Cosmetics Act and consideration of proposals to give
the FDA authority to regulate tobacco-and concluding that the FDA lacked such authority).
Further support is drawn from the analogous case United States v. Estate of Romani, in which
the Court harmonized the impact of two statutes on the government's power to collect delinquent
taxes by noting that "actual measures taken by Congress provide a superior insight regarding its
intent." 523 U.S. 517, 530-31, 534 (1998). The Court looked to a specific policy in a subsequent
federal statute, allowing it to control construction of an earlier statute that had not been
expressly amended. Id. at 530-31.
217. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 155-56.
218. Cf. United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 281-82 (1947) (refusing to
rely on statements by senators made eleven years after enactment of the Norris-LaGuardia Act
as authoritative guides to construction of the statute, in part because of changes in Senate
membership).
219. Cf. Blumstein Testimony, supra note 65, at 7 (stating that the reporting requirement
"[a]t most ... demonstrates a misunderstanding of the provisions of the ACA").
220. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.

1296

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66:4:1259

employing the avoidance canon, which requires construing a
potentially ambiguous statute so as to avoid serious constitutional

difficulties. 22 1
However, in practice, one substantive canon drives agencies:
"advance the interpretation that best advances the statutory purpose
(so long as the statutory text can accommodate that
interpretation)." 222 Ultimately, it seems likely that the strength of the
in pari materia reading would persuade a court that the IRS is
advancing the statutory purpose by implementing the exchange
structure Congress envisioned. The many suggestions in the statute
that federal exchanges would operate in much the same way as state
exchanges creates sufficient space in the statute to accommodate this
reading.
A second counterargument to applying the in pari materia
reading is that Congress amended a separate section 36B provision, so
its failure to amend the part relevant to the IRS's interpretation at
that time indicates that it did not wish to do so. Failure to act may be
useful if it can be shown that Congress considered and rejected a
position. 223 Here, a search of legislative history does not show
discussion of the tax credit issue during the process of enacting the
section 36B amendments; Congress did not act to reject a proposal to
include federal exchanges in the tax credit scheme. Thus, the
argument emphasizing failure to act is weak.
The strongest support for the IRS's interpretation in its final
rule comes from subsequent legislation. An in pari materia reading of
the ACA and the HCERA sheds much light on congressional intent
and facilitates an understanding of how Congress intended exchanges
to operate. Further, common sense confirms the analysis, as it is
absurd to impose a reporting requirement for tax credits that will not
exist unless federal exchanges can distribute tax credits. The best way
to explain the omission might be that it was an erroneous oversight.
E. Mere Scrivener's Error?
The ultimate exceptions to the general rule that the statutory
text is the end of the interpretive inquiry are scrivener's errors or
221. See, e.g. Solid Waste Agency v. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 172-74 (2001)
(rejecting request for administrative deference by striking down the agency's interpretation
under step one of Chevron, and reading the statute to avoid significant constitutional questions
raised by the agency pushing the limits of congressional authority).
222. Eskridge & Baer, supra note 116, at 1201.
223. See Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614, 622 (2004) (finding meaning in legislative history
revealing Congress cut a specific portion of the statute).
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readings that would produce an absurd result. 224 It is possible that a
busy Congress will enact a drafting mistake, such as a typographical
error, into law, so a degree of common sense must be employed. 225
If faced with this argument, the IRS would carry the burden of
showing that this is one of the rare, extraordinary cases where
Congress almost surely could not have intended the result that flows
from a strict, literal interpretation of the statute. 226 This safety valve
of a canon requires that the most natural reading of the statute be not
merely unlikely, but "so lacking in plausible justifications that it
presses against the limits of established constitutional norms of
rationality." 227
Here, it is plausible (although, as this Note posits, not
probable) that Congress intentionally excluded exchanges established
under section 1321 from section 36B of the IRC in order to incentivize
the establishment of state exchanges. 228 Bolstering the case against a
scrivener's error is the fact that legislators did not merely neglect to
reference section 1321 in section 36B(b)(2)(A), but specified that only
certain taxpayers "enrolled through an Exchange established by the
state" would be eligible for a refundable tax credit. 229
The same line of reasoning-that Congress intended to
incentivize states to establish exchanges through the withholding of
tax credits-rules out application of the remedial-purposes canon, a
doctrine that calls for remedial legislation to be construed broadly to
224. See Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527 (1981) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(finding erroneous a literal reading of the word "defendant" in a statute that would produce an
absurd result).
225. Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, 543 U.S. 50, 65-66 (2004) (Stevens, J.,
concurring); see also, e.g., id. at 63-64 (relying on common sense in its determination of statutory
ambiguity). For a contrary position, see Moses v. Providence Hosp. & Med. Ctrs., 561 F.3d 573,
583 (6th Cir. 2009), in which the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the agency's
interpretation of the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act as contrary to the
plain language of the statute. Instead, the Court held that the Act imposes an obligation on
hospitals to treat a patient in order to stabilize his or her emergency medical condition, rather
than merely admitting a patient in good faith, recognizing that Congress may not have intended
this result. Id. at 580-82.
226. See United States v Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989) ("The plain meaning of
legislation should be conclusive, except in the 'rare cases [in which] the literal application of a
statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters.' " (quoting
Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982))).
227. John C. Nagle, Textualism's Exceptions, in 2 ISSUES LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, supra note
106, art. 15 at 3 (citing John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM.
L. REV. 1, 116 (2001)); see also, e.g., United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 93-94 (1985) (refusing to
find ambiguity in filing requirement of "prior to December 31," and upholding the literal
construction of December 30).
228. See supra Part III.B.
229. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1401, 124
Stat. 119 (2010) (to be codified in I.R.C. § 36B(b)(2)(A)) (emphasis added).
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effectuate its purposes. 230 The purpose of the ACA is not necessarily
thwarted by the unavailability of tax credits through federal
exchanges.
Because there exists a rational explanation for the omission,
the IRS would have difficulty persuading a court that it is a
scrivener's error-though it may well be that Congress simply
overlooked section 36B(b)(2)(A) when it added section 1321.
F. Chevron Step One: Conclusion
A reviewing court may be persuaded by a plain-text argument,
finding no ambiguity, and halt the inquiry after Chevron Step One. 231
Alternatively, it may use the canon of constitutional avoidance to
vacate the rule, thereby dodging a challenge that only Congress can
alter the tax code and spend money. 232 Section 36B(b)(2)(A) is the rare
case, however, in which plain meaning should not be conclusive
because "literal interpretation of [this] statute will produce a result
demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters."2 33
The reporting requirement imposed by section 1004 of the
HCERA is most probative, as it makes sense only when both state and
federal exchanges administer tax credits. In light of the HCERA tax
credit reporting requirement, excluding federal exchanges arguably
reaches the standard of "disturbingly unlikely" set in Public Citizen v.
United States Department of Justice.234 In Public Citizen, the Court
reviewed the prior regulatory scheme and relied on materials such as
legislative history to ascertain congressional intent: "[S]triv[ing] for
allegiance to Congress' desires" in a case where the plain meaning of
the word "utilize" in the Federal Advisory Committee Act would have
been "outlandish" but not "absurd."2 35

230. YULE KIM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 97-589, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: GENERAL
PRINCIPLES AND RECENT TRENDS 29-30 (2008) (discussing the rarely used remedial purposes
canon).
231. See, e.g., MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 234 (1994)
(rejecting an agency interpretation that "may well be a better regime but is not the one that
Congress established" by the plain words of the text); cf. Locke, 471 U.S. at 93-94 (upholding
agency's literal construction of a statute that imposed a filing requirement of "prior to December
31"). Consider that the agency in Locke adhered to the text of the statute, and question why it
felt constrained by the statute. Locke, 471 U.S. at 96.
232. See supra Part III.D. (explaining how a large employer could establish standing to
challenge the IRS Rule).
233. United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989) (quoting Griffin v.
Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982)).
234. Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 453 n.9 (1989).
235. Id.
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The IRS's interpretation of the ACA presents a similar
situation. Because of the plausibility of the plain-text reading of
section 36B(b)(2)(A), a literal interpretation does not rise to the level
of absurdity. The postenactment legislation and the healthcare-reform
statutory scheme as a whole are particularly probative of
congressional intent to make tax credits available in all states.
Analyzing the broader statutory context, legislative history,
and the effect of the HCERA reveals that the availability of tax credits
through federal exchanges is not as clear as the plain text of section
36B(b)(2)(A) suggests. Finding ambiguity in section 36B means that
Chevron Step Two is necessary to determine whether the IRS's
interpretation is acceptable.
VI. CHEVRON STEP Two: BEING REASONABLE
When the search effort reveals that a statute's meaning is
unclear, the court will next ask whether the agency's interpretation is
reasonable.236 A court must act as a faithful agent of the statute and
avoid immersion in political debate. The agency, on the other hand, is
afforded more latitude in its interpretation, as it is able to rely more
heavily on policy considerations and can pay attention to politics. 237
The Court in Mayo Foundation for Medical Education &
Research v. United States made clear that Chevron principles apply in
the tax context and 2 38 stated that, in Step Two, it would uphold an
agency rule unless it was "arbitrary and capricious" or "manifestly
contrary to the statute." 239 Although scholars of administrative law
236. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984); see also
Bressman, supra note 120, at 562 ("[C]ourts treat a lack of clarity as the exclusive proxy for
interpretive delegation."); cf. Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992) ("When
the words of a statute are unambiguous, then, this first canon is also the last: 'judicial inquiry is
complete.' "). But cf. Matthew C. Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron Has Only One Step,
95 VA. L. REV. 597, 597-604 (2009) (suggesting that the two-step Chevron framework is an
artificial division that creates a redundancy, and refraining the doctrine as a single inquiry).
237. See Health Ins. Ass'n of Am. v. Shalala, 23 F.3d 412, 416 (D.C. Cir. 1994) ("Review of
an agency's construction of an ambiguous statute is review of the agency's policy judgments.");
Mashaw, supra note 106, at 9 (explaining why an agency's "interpretive agenda" includes
political and policy considerations that would be improper for courts to consider). Sensitivity to
policy considerations and paying attention to politics boosts an agency's democratic legitimacy.

Id.
238. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 713 (2011);
see supra Part IV.B.
239. Mayo, 131 S. Ct. at 711. Mayo did not completely clarify the relationship between
Chevron Step Two and arbitrary and capricious review; when it applied Chevron, the Mayo
Court upheld the regulations at issue because they were a "reasonable interpretation" of the
statute. Id. at 714-16. For a discussion of judicial acceptance of the idea that "arbitrary and
capricious" review is the same as Chevron review, see Bill Araiza, More News From the World of
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have long debated the relationship between Step Two and arbitraryand-capricious review under APA section 706(2)(A), the dominant
view is that the two correspond. 240 Indeed, the Mayo Foundationcourt
suggests that the two tests are different sides of the same coin. 24 1
In Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, the Court
described the arbitrary-and-capricious test of APA section 706(2)(A),
establishing what is known as "hard look" review.242 The inquiry
articulated in Overton Park is applied here to evaluate the process by
which the IRS came to its final rule.
Under "hard look" review, the court must establish that the
agency's decision is grounded in a record and must evaluate whether
the agency's decision is reasonable. 243 The Overton Park Court stated
that review must be "searching and careful," and it was careful to
emphasize that a court "is not empowered to substitute its judgment
for that of the agency."244 It also made clear to agencies that they are
required to give a reasoned explanation for their decisions and must
explain their rejection of alternatives. 245
This Part evaluates the IRS's process under the framework a
reviewing court would likely employ. It walks through three steps: (1)
asking whether the Agency acted within its scope of authority, (2)
applying the standard of reasonableness articulated in section
706(A)(2) of the APA, and (3) considering whether the Agency adhered
Chevron, PRAWFSBLAWG (May 22, 2012, 4:16 PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/
2012/05/more-news-from-the-world-of-chevron.html.
240. The test for reasonableness was set out in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v.

State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). See infra Part VI.A. Therefore,
the question is whether Step Two's "reasonableness" test equates to the State Farm
"reasonableness" test. An understanding that the two tests match "can be squared with Chevron
itself and Supreme Court applications of Chevron, is consistent with if not required by general
principles of administrative law, and is normatively attractive." M. Elizabeth Magill, Step Two of
Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Counsel, in A GUIDE TO JUDICIAL AND POLITICAL REVIEW
OF FEDERAL AGENCIES 96-97 (John Fitzgerald Duffy & Michael E. Herz eds., 2005).
241. Mayo, 131 S. Ct. at 711-13; Patrick M. Garry, Judicial Review and the "Hard Look"
Doctrine, 7 NEV. L.J. 151, 151-70 (2006) (overviewing "hard look" review under which courts use
§ 706's "arbitrary" and "capricious" review to "provid[e] a substantive judicial check on agency
power").
242. 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1971), abrogatedon other grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S.
99 (1977); see also Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 173-74 (2007) ("Where
an agency rule sets forth important individual rights and duties, where the agency focuses fully
and directly upon the issue, where the agency uses full notice-and-comment procedures to
promulgate a rule, where the resulting rule falls within the statutory grant of authority, and
where the rule itself is reasonable, then a court ordinarily assumes that Congress intended it to
defer to the agency's determination.").
243. Garry, supra note 241, at 156.

244. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 415.
245. See Garry, supra note 241, at 156 (explaining the "two principle elements" of hard-look
review).
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to procedural requirements in its decisionmaking process. Next, it
turns to the Agency's public explanations of its extension of tax credits
to federal exchanges.
A. Evaluatingthe Agency's Process
Under Overton Park, the court will first ask whether the
specific IRS action was within the scope of statutory authority and
whether the action was reasonably within the range of the Secretary's
permissible choices. 246 Recall that the Secretary of the Treasury is
guided and constrained by the language of section 36B(g): the
Secretary can act to implement "such regulations as may be necessary
to carry out the provisions of this section."247 Looking to the title of
section 36B, "Refundable Credit for Coverage Under a Qualified
Health Plan," the task of the IRS is relatively narrow: the Agency is to
consider tax credits. If section 36B(b)(2)(B) is understood as making
the tax credit available through both federal and state exchanges,
then arguably the addition of federal exchanges to section 36B(b)(2)(A)
was necessary. Also, based on the ACA definition of "qualified health
plan," the Agency's task is not limited to state exchanges. A qualified
health plan is one that meets the certification criteria detailed in
section 1311(c) or is "recognized by each Exchange through which such
plan is offered," and these plans can even be offered directly from the
issuer or through an agent rather than an exchange. 248 Thus, a
"qualified health plan" is not confined to those issued through a
section 1311 state exchange.
The reviewing court will next apply the standard of
reasonableness set forth in the APA. A court must set aside agency
actions and conclusions that are "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law."249 Requiring a
"rational connection between the facts found and the choice made," the
Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. State Farm Mutual Auto
Insurance Company Court announced the applicable rule: to meet the
reasonableness condition, the agency may not rely on factors Congress
did not intend for it to consider, nor can it completely fail to consider
246. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 415-16.
247. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1401(g), 124
Stat. 119, 218 (2010) (to be codified at I.R.C. § 36B(g)) (emphasis added).
248. ACA § 1301(a) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18021).
249. Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006); see also Chevron,
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984) (stating that when
Congress implicitly gives an agency authority to fill a gap, the standard is reasonability of
agency interpretation).
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an important aspect of the problem, offer an explanation contradicted
by evidence before the agency, or offer an explanation that is so
implausible that it cannot be attributed to agency expertise. 250
After considering the comments it received, the IRS must give
"a concise general statement" of the final rule's "basis and purpose" as
part of the promulgated rule-a requirement which it met.25 1 As the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia explained,
"such a statement should indicate the major issues of policy that were
raised in the proceedings and explain why the agency decided to
respond to those issues as it did, particularly in light of the statutory
objectives that the rule must serve."252 The Secretary must go beyond
cursory treatment of concerns raised during the comment process and
avoid the temptation of relying on policies other than the objectives
specified in the ACA. 253
An agency must be careful to "show its work." Even if a court,
after analyzing the rule under Step One of Chevron, agrees that the
IRS's interpretation of section 36B(b)(2)(B) is one possible meaning, it
cannot save the rule by supplying reasoning the Agency itself did not
give. 254 Absent agency reasoning, the statutory text represents the
beginning and end of interpretation. In essence, the final rule needs to
have been written ever mindful of the possibility of judicial review.
The IRS used 153 words to address the issue of including
federal exchanges in its tax credit arrangements. 255 It is questionable
250. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
251. APA § 553(c); see also, e.g., Indep. U.S. Tanker Owners Comm. v. Dole, 809 F.2d 847,
851-55 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding that a rule promulgated by the Secretary of Transportation was
arbitrary and capricious because of failure to comply with § 553's "concise general statement"
requirement).
252. Indep. U.S. Tanker Owners Comm., 809 F.2d at 852; see also PETER L. STRAUSS ET AL.,
GELLHORN AND BYSE'S ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 161-63 (11th ed. 2011) (discussing the Independent

U.S. Tanker Owners Commission case).
253. Indep. U.S. Tanker Owners Comm., 809 F.2d at 853-54. The court expects a candid
discussion from the Secretary if conditions make it impossible to meet all objectives explicit in
the Act. Id. at 854 n.4.
254. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984); cf.
Kevin M. Stack, The Constitutional Foundations of Chenery, 116 YALE L.J. 952, 1005 (2007)
(comparing Chevron, 467 U.S. 837, with SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 95 (1943)) ("[A] court
should not defer to an agency's construction of a statute at Chevron Step Two unless the agency
embraced that construction at the time it acted, not merely in litigation."). If the court does not
demand explanation of the IRS's reasoning but disagrees with the wisdom of application of tax
credits to federal Exchanges, it may not substitute its own judgment for that of the agency. See
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844 (stating that an agency's interpretation of its own statute trumps a
court's when that statute is ambiguous); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401
U.S. 402, 416 (1971) (same), abrogated on other grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99
(1977).

255. See Health Insurance Premium Tax Credit, 77 Fed. Reg. 30,377, 30,378 (May 23, 2012)
(defending IRS interpretation of 26 U.S.C. § 36B as codified at 26 C.F.R. § 1.36B-5 (2012)).
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whether this was cursory treatment or whether the IRS believed the
issue to be entirely without merit. In relevant part, it reads:
The statutory language of section 36B and other provisions of the Affordable Care Act
support the interpretation that credits are available to taxpayers who obtain coverage
through a State Exchange, regional Exchange, subsidiary Exchange, and the Federallyfacilitated Exchange. Moreover, the relevant legislative history does not demonstrate
that Congress intended to limit the premium tax credit to State Exchanges. Accordingly,
the final regulations maintain the rule in the proposed regulations because it is
consistent with the language, purpose, and structure of section 36B and the Affordable
256
Care Act as a whole.

Given the two relevant comments submitted 257 and the various
possible constructions of the statute, the IRS had to explain why it
believed it permissible to reach beyond the plain text of the statute. It
supported its decision to include federal exchanges in the tax credit
scheme by referring generally to other provisions in the ACA that
support its reading. 258 However, the Agency would have been wise to
discuss these provisions with specificity and to highlight the clear
vision of the health insurance overhaul Congress expressed through
the reporting requirement of the HCERA. 259 Additionally, the IRS
could have articulated that its reading is necessary for the Secretary
to accomplish the task of providing tax credits for coverage under all
qualified health plans. Citing other provisions in the ACA that
support its interpretation was probably the bare minimum the IRS
had to do to give its reading a chance of surviving Chevron Step Two.
The Agency could have offered more insight into its thought process,
but since it offered something, its reading is not deficient on this
ground.
Lastly, the court will ask whether an agency followed the
necessary
procedural
requirements. 260
Notice-and-comment
rulemaking is an appropriate process for this legislative rule, as it
gives interested parties an opportunity to participate by offering
comments; the Agency met the requirements of notice-and-comment
rulemaking. 261

256. Id.

257. See supraPart IV.A.
258. Id.
259. See supraPart V.D (detailing the reporting requirement).
260. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 417 (1971). But see
Astrue v. Capato, 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2034 (2012) (listing ways in which an agency regulation can be
challenged, as set out in United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001), but omitting
the "procedurally defective" language listed in Mead); Araiza, supra note 239.
261. See the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006), for an overview of
the notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures.
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An agency is not required by statute to offer a lengthy
explanation of its decision, but it should supply reasoning sufficiently
detailed to permit judicial review. 262 After receiving the two relevant
comments, the IRS could have put more thought into its treatment of
the issue-but its reasoning is probably not so inadequate that it
frustrates effective judicial review. 263 At least the Agency's reference
to the "language, purpose, and structure" of section 36B and the ACA
gives a reviewing court something to work with. 264
Generally, the reasonableness inquiry under Chevron Step Two
operates as a low bar; at this step a court is likely to defer to the
agency's interpretation. 265 Here, the IRS has a strong argument that
its interpretation is reasonable, because of Congress's requirement
that exchanges established under sections 1311 and 1321 report data
on tax credits.
B. The Agencies Speak
An agency administrator's public explanation might add little
to a court's analysis in the context of a traditional, one-agency statute.
However, the ACA's fragmented delegation provides the opportunity
for multiple agencies to offer conflicting or confirming interpretations.
Before issuing its final rule, the IRS publicly defended its
proposed rule, responding to a letter from twelve members of Congress
that criticized the Agency's position. 266 IRS Commissioner Douglas
Shulman stated:
The statute includes language that indicates that individuals are eligible for tax credits
whether they are enrolled through a State-based Exchange or a Federally-facilitated
Exchange. Additionally, neither the Congressional Budget Office score nor the Joint
262. Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142-43 (1973) (stating that the court should limit its
judicial review to the administrative record already in existence); Nat'l Nutritional Foods Ass'n
v. Weinberger, 512 F.2d 688, 701 (2d Cir. 1975). Agencies have the ability to gather and analyze
information about the costs and benefits of possible statutory interpretations, affording them a
vantage-point of expertise superior to that of the court. See generally Note, Chevron and the
Substantive Canons: A Categorical Distinction, 124 HARV. L. REV. 594 (2010) (arguing for
Chevron deference distinction between the Court's use of discretion-constraining canons and
discretion-channeling canons).
263. See Camp, 411 U.S. at 142-43 (holding that the proper standard of review for agency
decisions is whether the agency's decision, in light of the extant administrative record, was
"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law").
264. Health Insurance Premium Tax Credit, 77 Fed. Reg. 30,377, 30,378 (May 23, 2012) (to
be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1 & 602 (final regulations)).
265. See generally Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837
(1984) (outlining two-step deference regime).
266. Letter from Rep. David P. Roe, et al., to Douglas Shuman, IRS Commissioner (Nov. 4,
2011), available at http://roe.house.govfUploadedFiles/Letter-to_IRSCommissionerregarding
_tax_creditsunder_PPACA_-_11.03.11.pdf.
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Committee on Taxation technical explanation of the Affordable Care Act discusses
excluding those enrolled through a Federally-facilitated Exchange. 267

The agency with the broadest, birds-eye view of the ACA-the
HHS-lacks the authority to promulgate regulations implementing
section 36B. However its understanding of the statute as a whole gives
it a unique vantage point from which to opine on the proper
construction. In a question-and-answer document about exchanges,
the Agency addressed the issue:
The proposed regulations issued by the Treasury Department, and the related proposed
regulations issued by the Department of Health and Human Services, are clear on this
point and supported by the statute. Individuals enrolled in coverage through either a
State-based Exchange or a Federally-facilitated Exchange may be eligible for tax
credits, including advance payments. Additionally, neither the Congressional Budget
Office score nor the Joint Committee on Taxation technical explanation discussed
limiting the credit to those enrolled through a State-based Exchange. 268

Though not dispositive, a court might consider the synergies of
the combined expertise of multiple agencies. 269 Chevron's expertise
rationale seems particularly strong here given the complexity of the
IRC and the sheer size of the ACA.
C. Chevron Step Two: Conclusion
The IRS's final rule presents a strong case for Chevron
deference. 270 In light of the broader statutory context, the unclear
legislative history, the very clear subsequent legislation, and the
267. Letter from Douglas H Shuman, IRS Commissioner, to Rep. David P. Roe
(Nov. 29, 2011), available at http://roe.house.gov/UploadedFiles/IRSResponse to_letter_on.
PPACAExchange.pdf.
268. State Exchange Implementation Questions and Answers, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID

SERVS.,

8

(Nov.

29,

2011),

http://cciio.cms.gov/resources/files/Files2/11282011/

exchange q..and-a.pdf.pdf.
269. See Gersen, supra note 132 (suggesting that when multiple agencies share the
responsibility of implementing a statute, all of them might have more expertise than the courts).
Merrill and Hickman suggest employing Skidmore deference if the statutory interpretation of
affected agencies conflicts, enforcing the interpretation with the greatest power to persuade.
Merrill & Hickman, supranote 130, at 895-96.
270. If a reviewing court determines that Chevron deference is not warranted in this case,
the IRS may still receive a degree of deference under Skidmore, based on the agency's power to
persuade. See Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S. 134 (1944) ("The weight of such a judgment in a
particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its
reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which
give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control."). The court will consider factors such as
the thoroughness of the agency's decision, its logic, and the degree of expertise the agency brings
to the issue. Id. at 139-40. Here, the Internal Revenue Code is an extremely complex statute, so
the expertise of the IRS would likely be a very strong consideration. See also Christensen v.
Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 586-87 (2000) (affirming that Chevron and Skidmore remain two
distinct doctrines). See generally Merrill & Hickman, supra note 130, at 853-64 (discussing
Chevron and Skidmore as two separate deference regimes).
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inapplicability of expressio unius, a court would likely deem the plain
text ambiguous.
One additional principle weighs in favor of the IRS. Rather
than leaving the issue to "the vagaries of the legislative process ...
courts will sometimes prefer the certainty of an agency's rule."27 1 If a
court employs strict textualism in this case, Congress will have to
amend the statute to make tax credits available through federal
exchanges-a process a court might want to avoid for a variety of
reasons. 272 The process of corrective amendment can be lengthy and
time consuming. 273 And, given the political climate, Republican
Congressmen may be unwilling to approve a "fix" of the statute, even
if an amendment would merely clarify their original understanding
and intent.274 With the alternative being a cumbersome legislative
route, a court may be more inclined to acknowledge the IRS's expertise
and reasonableness.
The challenges inherent in punting to Congress increase the
likelihood that a court will accept the rule, request a supplemented
record, or remand to the Agency, instead of completely vacating the
rule. 275 An agency is to implement a statute in a way that best
advances the statutory purpose, as long as the text can accommodate
the agency's interpretation. 276 The purpose of section 1401 is to
provide tax credits for coverage under a qualified health plan, and the
ultimate purpose of the ACA is to ensure all Americans have access to
affordable health insurance. 277

271. Wright, supra note 183, at 235.
272. See Hatch Letter, supra note 64 ("[I]f the wording and effect of section 36B should
somehow be different, then legislation is the appropriate means of changing section 36B.");
cf. Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 351,
372-73 (1994) (suggesting that there is "an inverse relationship between the rise of textualism
and the waning of Chevron"). But see United States v. Haggar Apparel Co., 526 U.S. 380 (1999)
(addressing what is required to overcome the presumption in favor of Chevron deference, and
suggesting the presumption is strong).
273. YULE KIM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 97-589, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: GENERAL
PRINCIPLES AND RECENT TRENDS 2 (2008).
274. Suderman, supra note 69.
275. Instead of vacating a regulation, a court may choose to demand a supplemented
explanation through either affidavits or testimony. Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 143 (1973).
276. Eskridge & Baer, supranote 116, at 1201.
277. See generally YULE KIM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 97-589, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION:
GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND RECENT TRENDS 2 (2008) ("A cardinal rule of construction is that a
statute be read as a harmonious whole, with its various parts being interpreted within their
broader statutory context in a manner that furthers statutory purposes.").
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VII. CONCLUSION
Ensuring all Americans have access to affordable,
comprehensive health insurance is the paramount purpose of the
ACA. Exchanges are integral to the statute's healthcare-reform
strategy because they make federal tax credits and cost-sharing
reductions available to those who need financial assistance in order to
comply with the individual mandate.
Congressional silence on the availability of tax credits through
exchanges established by the Secretary under section 1321(c) creates
ambiguity in the statute, which is amplified by conflicting legislative
history and postenactment legislation. A court applying Chevron will
likely find ambiguity and deem the IRS interpretation to be
reasonable in light of the HCERA requirement that both state and
federal exchanges must report tax credit data.
Resolution of this issue is unlikely to be swift. Congress could
choose to fill in or clarify the gap, but corrective amendment can be a
lengthy process. A judicial ruling on this "elephant in a mousehole"
must necessarily wait until 2014, when a large employer fined under
section 4980H can contest the regulations. When the time comes, a
reviewing court will in all probability defer to the IRS's construction of
the statute, as it is "disturbingly unlikely" that Congress intended the
results that flow from a strict, literal reading 278-a reading that would
leave residents of many states, all subject to the ACA's individual
mandate, unable to access the tax credits promised to them to make
their mandated insurance coverage affordable.
Amy E. Sanders*

278. See Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 453 n.9 (1989) ("Nor does it
strike us as in any way 'unhealthy,' or undemocratic to use all available materials in
ascertaining the intent of our elected representatives, rather than read their enactments as
requiring what may seem a disturbingly unlikely result, provided only that the result is not
'absurd.'" (citations omitted)).
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